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Abstract
The article explores the classic consumer- merchant dichotomy from the van-
tage of small businesses. Using empirical data and the psychology, economics,
and management literature, it shows that small businesses, treated like large busi-
nesses throughout most of contract and commercial law, in fact behave more like
consumers. Small businesses lack the financial strength of large businesses. They
generally lack the information gathering ability of large businesses. Finally, they
generally are more prey to cognitive errors than are large businesses. As a result,
small businesses lose in two ways. When they deal with consumers, they are pre-
sumed to have the power, information, and cognitive capacity of large firms. The
law thus obliges them to grant protections based on asymmetries that may not ex-
ist. When they deal with large businesses, the law treats them as essentially equal,
even though small businesses may suffer from the same disadvantages that require
legal intervention for consumers. The article considers the ways in which the law
can deal with this false dichotomy and suggests some solutions, particularly in the
way the law treats risk allocation.
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Small Business and the False Dichotomies of Contract Law
Larry T. Garvin*
“There may be said to be two classes of people in the world: those who constantly
divide the people of the world into two classes, and those who do not.”
– Robert Benchley
Law is rife with simplifying divides – law or equity, civil or criminal, public or private,
guilty or not guilty.  Simplicity has many virtues, as the persistence of these dichotomies and
others shows.  Still, for each of these we can come up with examples that blur the lines – that fall
on both sides, or neither, or that cut across the lines in odd ways.  Is assault civil or criminal?  Is
products liability contract or tort?  
Contract law unsurprisingly has its own categories.  Some – expectation, reliance, and
restitution come to mind – are not dichotomous, but many are.  Usually these bins are in the form
of X or not-X: thus, unconscionable or not, impracticable or not, breached or not, supported by
consideration or not.  Even here, though, many have argued that these distinctions hide as much as
they reveal.  Most notably, they tend to hide intermediate positions.  Suppose, for instance, a
contract proves burdensome but not quite impracticable.  Might it be appropriate for the
unexpected risk to be shared between the contracting parties?1  Indeed, a good many contract
doctrines have come about as attempts to bridge the crevasses of the starker dichotomies. 
Classical consideration doctrine, for instance, is loosened by many supplementary doctrines
recognizing that not all promises fall neatly into the bargained-for and the not bargained-for. 
http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/art1
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
3 U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (2001).
4 For a partial list of others, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 82-94
(1981).
5 See, e.g., William J. Woodward, Jr., “Sale” of Law and Forum and the Widening
Gulf Between “Consumer” and “Nonconsumer” Contracts in the UCC, 75 WASH. U.L. REV.
243 (1997).
6 See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-508 (extending cure to revocation for non-consumers, thus
codifying one line of cases); 2-710 (subjecting non-consumer buyers to consequential damages
liability); 2-716(1) (allowing enforcement of agreements for specific performance in non-
consumer contracts); 2-718(1) (taking difficulty of proof of loss into account when enforcing
liquidated damages clauses only for non-consumer contracts) (2003).
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Promissory estoppel2 and modifications in sales law3 are merely examples.4
Beyond these legal dichotomies are status-driven dichotomies that cut across legal lines.
Two such dichotomies important in modern contract law are consumer versus non-consumer and
merchant versus non-merchant.  These appear throughout the statute books and even, though
unsystematically, in the rationes decidendi of the cases.  In practice these dichotomies are often
melded, putting consumers on one side and merchants on the other.  Like the others, these splits
are perfectly rational to a point.  Consumers differ from non-consumers in many salient areas, as
do merchants from non-merchants.  In each case, one group is generally considered weaker, less
informed, less sophisticated, poorer, less able to reason, less able to bargain.  These differences
are sufficiently shared that collapsing the two has some merit.  In law drafting, these collapsed
dichotomies often yield the combination of a loose consumer rule and a stiff non-consumer rule
on the theory that non-consumers are by and large merchants who can take care of themselves.5 
For example, the proposed amendments to Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code at times
push non-consumer law toward freedom of contract while reserving or expanding protections for
consumers.6
This Article’s thesis is that these dichotomies – consumer versus non-consumer, merchant
versus non-merchant, and, worst of all, consumer versus merchant – are false, because small
businesses do not fall cleanly into any of these categories.  In many ways, they most resemble
consumers and non-merchants in their abilities to deal with risk, whether financially or
cognitively, to secure and process information, and to fend for themselves in the market. 
Nevertheless they are generally – almost invariably – treated like merchants.  Small businesses
thus get the worst of each dichotomy.  In their dealings with consumers, small businesses must
give protections based on asymmetries that may not exist.  In their dealings with larger businesses,
small businesses are treated as though the parties are essentially equal, which will not usually be
true save in the most formal sense.  By putting small businesses on the wrong side of each
dichotomy, the law may thus promote inefficiency, burdening small businesses on the one hand
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
7 Others have commented, though with different purposes and using different
methods, about the imperfect fit between contract doctrine and small business status.  See, e.g.,
Blake D. Morant, The Quest for Bargains in an Age of Contractual Formalism: Strategic
Initiatives for Small Businesses, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 233 (2003); Janet W.
Steverson, I Mean What I Say, I Think: The Danger to Small Businesses of Entering into Legally
Enforceable Agreements That May Not Reflect Their Intentions, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L.
283 (2003).  Without calling into question the conclusions reached in these and similar articles,
this article seeks to look closely at the causes of the imperfect fit, thus allowing us to devise more
nuanced ways to treat small business in the law of contract.
8 See, e.g., David B. Audretsch, The Dynamic Role of Small Firms: Evidence from
the U.S., 18 SMALL BUS. ECON. 13 (2002) (net employment gain higher for small firms than
large; innovation rate higher as well); D. Keith Robbins et al., An Empirical Assessment of the
Contribution of Small Business Employment to U.S. State Economic Performance, 15 SMALL
BUS. ECON. 293 (2000) (state productivity growth, Gross State Product growth, lower wage
inflation, and lower unemployment all correlate with higher proportions of small business
employment).  See generally Morant, supra note 7, at 240-44 (summarizing literature).
There is something of a debate about the virtues of small business and whether it should
get any special legal protection.  Professor Pierce, most notably, finds the contributions of small
business overblown and its harms – high pollution, poor workplace safety, excessive
employment discrimination, and others – very high.  Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Small is Not
Beautiful: The Case Against Special Regulatory Treatment of Small Firms, 50 ADMIN. L. REV.
537 (1998).  One might also point to the very high failure rate of small firms, estimated at around
half within five years.  See, e.g., RICHARD J. BODEN, JR., U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., ANALYSES OF
BUSINESS DISSOLUTION BY DEMOGRAPHIC CATEGORY OF BUSINESS OWNERSHIP i (2000),
available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs204tot.pdf; Alfred Nucci, The Demography of
Business Closings, 12 SMALL BUS. ECON. 25 (1999).  Each failure carries with it both financial
disappointment or disaster and personal tragedy.  See, e.g., CLAIRE WHYLEY, RISKY BUSINESS:
THE PERSONAL AND FINANCIAL COSTS OF SMALL BUSINESS FAILURE (1998).  The problem is
broader than business failure.  In the 1990s, aggregate household wealth rose in the U.S., but the
rise was almost entirely among households owning no small businesses.  In other words,
households owning small businesses gained less than those that did not.  George W. Haynes &
Charles Ou, Income and Wealth: How Did Households Owning Small Businesses Fare from
1992 to 1998 (June 17, 2002), available at
http://opal.msu.montana.edu/ghaynes/research/riw%20paper%201%20with%20tables.pdf.  Small
wonder, then, that some economists have proposed that small businesses not only should not
receive subsidies to start, but their founders should be paid not to start these costly and damaging
enterprises.  David de Meza & David Webb, Wealth, Enterprise and Credit Policy, 109 ECON. J.
153 (1999).
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and failing to protect them on the other.7  Put otherwise, the law may in a sense subject small
businesses to a regulatory tax – a peculiar tax indeed, if small businesses are, as we are told, the
driving forces of our economy.8
http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/art1
This Article need not decide whether these points are well taken.  Even if they are, at
most they speak against treating small businesses especially well because they are small, or
entrepreneurs especially well because they are entrepreneurs.  They do not generally favor
imposing taxes indiscriminately upon small businesses, as these false dichotomies effectively do. 
I should add that I recognize the force of Professor Pierce’s arguments, but think they are
overstated and to a degree misdirected – alas, for reasons too extensive to lay out in the margin. 
See, e.g., David B. Audretsch, Small Firms and Efficiency, in ARE SMALL FIRMS IMPORTANT?:
THEIR ROLE AND IMPACT 21, 31-33 (Zoltan J. Acs ed., 1999) [hereinafter ARE SMALL FIRMS
IMPORTANT?]; Bo Carlsson, Small Business, Entrepreneurship, and Industrial Dynamics, in ARE
SMALL FIRMS IMPORTANT?, supra, at 99, 100-103. Sang V. Nguyen & Seung-Hoon Lee, Returns
to Scale in Small and Large U.S. Manufacturing Establishments: Further Evidence, 19 SMALL
BUS. ECON. 41, 41 (2002).  A much more nuanced analysis is C. Steven Bradford, Does Size
Matter?  An Economic Analysis of Small Business Exemptions from Regulation, 8 J. SMALL &
EMERGING BUS. L. 1 (2004).
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Part I of this Article surveys briefly some instances where these dichotomies appear in the
law.  Consumer statutes of necessity define consumer to limit their scope.  Other statutes have
rules that apply to merchants or consumers, though, and some deal with transaction types carried
out almost exclusively by one or the other.  Part II considers why consumers, on the one hand, and
merchants, on the other, are treated specially.  In particular, it will focus on risk-spreading,
information, and cognition. For each, it places small businesses on the consumer-merchant
continuum.  Though generalizations are hazardous at best when directed toward as varied a group
as small businesses, one can say that many small businesses are more prone to problems with risk-
spreading, information cost, and cognitive defect than their larger counterparts, without the self-
correcting mechanisms that size can bring.  They thus resemble consumers to a great degree, not
the larger firms with which they are legally grouped.  Part III will look at how the law could deal
with small businesses, given their status between consumers and merchants.  One possibility is to
treat all businesses like consumers – put otherwise, use a uniform rule designed primarily for
consumers.  More moderately, one could merely treat small businesses like consumers.  Another
is to divide the merchant category into small and not-small, with the small merchant treated more
like a consumer.  Still another is to abandon the bright-line distinctions, save in the easiest cases,
and use a market basket of standards to give contracting parties greater or lesser protections case
by case.  Each of these methods has strengths and weaknesses.   A conclusion suggests areas in
which these approaches might be useful, taking into account the empirical and theoretical
rationales developed earlier.
I. SOME CONTRACTS DICHOTOMIES
What follows is far from a complete list of rules that give either consumers or merchants
special status.  A complete list would add little if anything to the analysis but much to the length. 
Those laid out here are at least relatively prominent and, more to the point, show with some clarity
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
9 One other division warrants brief notice.  The Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act (UCITA) contains rules applying only to mass-market licenses.  See, e.g., UNIF.
COMPUTER INFO. TRANS. ACT §§ 112(e)(3)(B), 209, 304(b)(2), & 704(b) & (d) (2000); see also
UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANS. ACT § 102(a)(44) (2000) (definition of mass-market transaction).  
At least in principle, these rules provide greater protections for licensees than do the fairly harsh
general rules.  Mass-market transactions include, but are not limited to, consumer transactions. 
The added scope is, however, modest.  For a non-consumer transaction to qualify as a mass-
market transaction, it must surmount a good many obstacles.  The transaction must be a retail
transaction in a normal retail quantity.  UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANS. ACT § 102(a)(44)(B)(ii)
(2000).  It must not involve a site license.  Id. § 102(a)(44)(B)(iii)(III).  It must be for information
directed toward the general public as a whole.  Id. § 102(a)(44)(B)(iii)(II).  Many businesses,
especially small ones, buy some of their routine software off the shelf at the local store, but even
then they often will depend on software acquired via purchase orders or software that, though
marketed widely, is directed mainly at businesses.  For more on the mass-market concept in
UCITA, see Jean Braucher, The Failed Promise of the UCITA Mass-Market Concept and its
Lessons for Policing of Standard Form Contracts, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 393 (2003).
UCITA is in force in two states, Maryland and Virginia.  MD. CODE ANN. COM. LAW §§
22-101 to 22-816 (Supp. 2002); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-501.1 to 509.2 (Michie 2001).  Its often
controversial provisions and drafting history have led four states, Iowa, North Carolina, Vermont,
and West Virginia, to enact statutes that render ineffective choice of law clauses that would apply
UCITA.  IOWA CODE ANN. § 554.D104(4) (West Supp. 2002); N.C. GEN STAT. ANN. § 66-329
(2001); Act of May 29, 2003, No. 44 (to be codified at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2463a),
available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/legdoc.cfm?URL=/docs/2004/acts/Act 044.HTM; W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-8-15 (Supp. 2002).    Faced with massive opposition, including a lack of
endorsement by the ABA, NCCUSL recently decided not to seek further enactments of UCITA
and to discharge its standby committee.  Letter of K. King Burnett to Fellow Commissioners
(Aug. 1, 2003), at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/ucita/KKB_UCITA_letter_8103.pdf.  Still, as
long as UCITA remains the law of at least one jurisdiction, contractual choice of law provisions
may put many software licenses not made in “bomb-shelter” states under its aegis.  See, e.g.,
Amelia H. Boss, The Jurisdiction of Commercial Law: Party Autonomy in Choosing Applicable
Law and Forum Under Proposed Revisions to the Uniform Commercial Code, 32 INT’L LAW.
1067 (1998); Larry T. Garvin, The Changed (and Changing?) Uniform Commercial Code, 26
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 285, 351 (1999) (referring to UCITA’s predecessor, Article 2B of the
U.C.C.); Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, State Regulation of Electronic Commerce, 51
EMORY L.J. 1 (2002); William J. Woodward, Jr., Contractual Choice of Law: Legislative Choice
in an Era of Party Autonomy, 54 SMU L. REV. 697 (2001).
UCITA also contains purely consumer provisions, using a conventional definition based
on the intended use by the licensor.  UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANS. ACT § 102(a)(16) (2000).  
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the sorts of policies underlying the dichotomies.9
A. Consumer versus non-consumer (usually merchant)
http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/art1
10 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (2000).
11 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (2000).
12 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (2000).
13 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (2000).
14 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301(1), (3) (2000) (definitions of “consumer product” and
“consumer” in Magnuson-Moss); 15 U.S.C. § 1602(h) (2000) (definition of “consumer” for
Truth-in-Lending Act).
15 15 U.S.C. § 1667(1) (2000).  See also UNIF. CONSUMER LEASES ACT §§
102(a)(2)(B) & 104(a) (2001) (scope of Act limited to consumer leases, which are defined partly
in terms of the lessee’s intended use for personal, family, or household purposes). 
16 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(c) (Fair Credit Reporting Act); 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3)
(2000) (Fair Debt Collection Practices Act).
17 This definition is read broadly.  16 C.F.R. § 700.1(a) (2002).
18 See, e.g., Louisiana Nat’l Leasing Corp. v. ADF Serv., Inc., 377 So. 2d 92 (La.
1979) (office copying machine not a consumer product).
19 See JONATHAN SHELDON & CAROLYN L. CARTER, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS
AND PRACTICES § 2.1.8 (5th ed. 2001).
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The distinction is at the root of most consumer law.  Though the precise definition of
consumer varies, one finds the idea all over federal law.  Examples include the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act,10 the Truth-in-Lending Act,11 the Fair Credit Reporting Act,12 and the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act,13 to name just a few.  The usual definition of consumer transaction is
tied to personal, family, or household use.14  Sometimes this relates to the transaction itself, as in
the Consumer Leasing Act,15 though more often it relates to the normal use of the goods or
services in question, as in Magnuson-Moss.  At times the definition applies simply to a natural
person.16  In any case, merchant transactions usually are excluded.  Corporations and partnerships
are not natural people, so they fall out of that set of definitions.  They almost always are when the
statute focuses on the transaction.  Where the focus is on the normal use of the goods or services,
then merchants may still be covered if they purchase goods ordinarily bought by consumers.17 
Goods only infrequently used by consumers are, however, outside that definition.18
Similar statutes appear in state law.  At least some state unfair and deceptive acts and
practices statutes apply only to consumer transactions, adopting the usual definition of personal,
family, or household use.19  The Uniform Commercial Code occasionally uses the concept as well. 
Though current Article 2 does not deal with consumers as such, Amended Article 2 has a good
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
20 U.C.C. §§ 2-103(c), 2-108(b), 2-316(2) & (3), 2-502(1)(a), 2-508(1) & (2), 2-
710(3), 2-716(1), 2-718(1), 2-725(1) (2003).
21 U.C.C. §§ 2A-106, -108(2), -108(4), -109(2), -221, -309, -406, -407, -504(3)(b),
& -516(3)(b) (2001); see also U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(e) (2001) (defining consumer lease).
22  U.C.C. §§ 9-612, -613, & -626 (2001).  Article Nine also has rules applying
specifically to consumer transactions.  See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-108, -403(d), -404(d), -614, & -616
(2001).
23 A more or less official account of these may be found at Steven L. Harris &
Charles W. Mooney, Revision of Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 – Secured Transactions,
Reporters’ Prefatory Comments (August 1998) 12-15, available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucc9/ann98pr.htm.  For a somewhat more jaundiced view, see
Jean Braucher, Deadlock: Consumer Transactions under Revised Article 9, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J.
83 (1999).
24 Perhaps one should add that much commercial law applies only to merchants –
not because consumers are barred from its rule, but because only merchants do some things.  Not
many consumers invoke the portions of the Uniform Commercial Code governing letters of
credit, warehouse receipts, or bills of lading, for instance.  One might compare contracting
principles in these areas to those in more homely counterparts to see whether these rules show
sterner mercantile standards.  Certainly this is not improbable.  Even a quick look at Article Five
of the U.C.C., governing letters of credit, suggests that it is most unsympathetic to the careless or
ignorant, more so than, say, the corresponding provisions of Article Three on negotiable
instruments.  Developing this thesis goes well beyond the scope of this Article.
25 C.I.S.G. Art. 2(a).
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many consumer provisions or exceptions.20  Article 2A on leases has a number of provisions that
apply only to consumer leases.21  Article 9 has an unusual arrangement – some provisions,
especially in the remedial sections, apply only to non-consumer transactions, but consumer
transactions are left unresolved.22  (This reflects an odd set of political compromises made late in
the drafting process.)23
B. Merchant versus non-merchant (often consumer)
This is a less common dichotomy, but it is common enough for our purposes.  Two major
uses bear mention.24  One is CISG, which does not govern sales of goods bought for personal,
family, or household use, save where the seller neither knew nor should have known that the
goods were thus bought.25  Practically speaking, this leaves consumers entirely excluded from its
http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/art1
26 U.C.C. §§ 2-103(1)(b), -201(2), -205, -207(2), -209(2), -314, -327(1)(c), -509(3), -
603, -605, & -609 (2001); see also U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (2001) (defining merchant).  Amended
Article 2 removes the merchant rules in § 2-207 and 2-509 and creates no new ones.
27 U.C.C. § 2-104 cmt. 2 (2001); see also, e.g., Olson v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 649 F.
Supp. 1511 (D. Kan. 1986); Donald v. City Nat’l Bank, 329 So. 2d 92 (Ala. 1976); Zanzig v.
H.P.M. Corp., 480 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); Gavula v. ARA Servs., Inc., 756 A.2d 17
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
28 This leaves aside the line of cases holding that farmers are not merchants.  See,
e.g., Loeb & Co. v. Schreiner, 321 So. 2d 199 (Ala. 1975); Cook Grains, Inc. v. Fallis, 395
S.W.2d 555 (Ark. 1965); Harvest States Coops. v. Anderson, 577 N.W.2d 381 (Wis. Ct. App.
1998).  But see, e.g., Colo.-Kan. Grain Co. v. Reifschneider, 817 P.2d 637 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991)
(farmer a merchant); Campbell v. Yokel, 313 N.E.2d 628 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (same); Ohio Grain
Co. v. Swisshelm, 318 N.E.2d 428 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973) (same).  These are hard to explain, save
by a rather quaint notion of the farmer as naïf, not as agribusiness CEO.  But see Ingrid
Michelsen Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl Llewellyn’s Attempt to Achieve the
Good, the True, the Beautiful in Commercial Law, 73 GEO. L.J.  1141, 1176-79 (1985) (Karl
Llewellyn distinguished farmers from merchants).
29 U.C.C. § 2-201(2) (2001).
30 U.C.C. § 2-104 cmt. 2 (2001) (this section and the other merchant rules in Part 2
of Article 2 “rest on normal business practices which are or ought to be typical of and familiar to
any person in business”).
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scope.  The other is Article 2 of the U.C.C., which has several rules applying only to merchants.26 
These do not have uniform application, as the comments tell us.  In particular, the definition as
used in the merchantability warranty is relatively narrow, excluding even merchants who lack
sufficient expertise with the product.27  The other senses of the word, however, are more closely
linked to ordinary business functions, and should leave out of the scope no serious businesspeople
– really, very few people other than consumers.28  This fits their main effects.  The merchant rule
in the Article Two Statute of Frauds, for instance, allows a confirmatory letter to satisfy the
Statute of Frauds against the recipient if the recipient does not respond with a written objection
within ten days.29  Here the merchant has no particular expertise that makes a sterner rule apt;
rather, the merchant is assumed to read and answer her mail regularly, and is treated as though she
does so.30
II. CONSUMERS, MERCHANTS, AND SMALL BUSINESSES: 
AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Contract law, particularly its statutory component, is thus rife with formal distinctions
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
31 It should be noted that these defenses to formation or enforcement themselves
may depend on things that correlate with status as merchant or consumer, issues to be discussed
later. 
32 See generally HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (1861).
33 Richard E. Speidel, Revising UCC Article 2: A View from the Trenches, 52
HASTINGS L.J. 607, 617-18 (2001).
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between consumers and non-consumers and between merchants and non-merchants.  Usually
these collapse into distinctions between consumers and merchants.  If we start from an assumption
of legal equality, though, why draw these distinctions?  Leaving aside incompetents and infants,
we all presumably can contract freely.  True, some of us may be put in positions where free assent
is an issue, but doctrines such as duress, mistake, misrepresentation, and non-disclosure can guard
against these.31  Giving special rights to consumers or placing special duties on merchants smacks
of a status-driven world, much the sort Sir Henry Maine thought was left behind by legal
progress.32
Perhaps we can explain the distinctions by considering, if only for a moment, some
stereotypes, not to say parodies.  A consumer might thus be described as a pitiful wretch, barely
able to pull a crumpled wad of greenbacks from his pocket to pay for some meretricious product,
lamentably ignorant of the merits of the goods he buys, unable to bargain or even shop – in short,
a powerless half-wit whose fundamental incapacity to bargain effectively make him desperately in
need of legal protection.  From a similar vantage, the merchant counterpart would combine the
less savory aspects of Commodore Vanderbilt, Kenneth Lay, and Ebenezer Scrooge.  She would
command markets from atop huge bags of ill-gotten lucre, cheating, conniving, stealing, and lying
for gain or even amusement.  Her products would be as shoddy as the market allows, based on her
perfect knowledge of how to pinch pennies and cut quality, and her compliance with the law
would be grudging at best.  
Neither portrait is exactly photographic.  Still, both, suitably airbrushed, have some basis
in truth.  Consumers, normally individuals or, at most, families, cannot be expected to act just like
merchants, if we take as a typical merchant a moderately large retailer or manufacturer – what
Professor Speidel calls the “strong seller.”33  These differences stem from a few basic causes. 
First, consumers on average lack the financial resources of merchants.  Second, they lack the
ability to get and deal with information.  Third, they are more prone to cognitive difficulties when
they are faced with information potentially pertinent to contracting.  These three differences, I
contend, explain the consumer-merchant distinction in contract and commercial law.  Consumer
protections reflect perceived defects in the abilities of consumers to operate in these three realms. 
Merchant rules reflect perceived skills. 
This structure allows us to look analytically at the place of small business in the consumer-
merchant continuum.  Small businesses are so varied that generalities are necessarily somewhat
inaccurate.  For that matter, merchants may be prone to some errors that consumers are not.  Still,
as this section will show, most small businesses fall closer to the consumer side than the merchant
side for each of these differences.
http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/art1
34 On the other hand, even a monopolist may be forced to price her goods
competitively, whether because of market elasticity, low entry barriers, or the ability of
consumers to delay purchases in hopes of securing better prices.  See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield et
al., Information-Based Principles for Rethinking Consumer Protection Policy, 21 J. CONSUMER
POL’Y 131, 135-37 (1998).  
35 Interestingly, the competition law of EU member states looks much more closely
at the effects of monopoly or oligopoly on small business.  See, e.g., Jochim Sedemund, The
Impact of Recent Amendments to German Cartel Law, in 1 INTERNATIONAL ANTI-TRUST LAW: A
REVIEW OF NATIONAL LAWS 66, 67 (Julian Maitland-Walker ed., 1984).  I am indebted to
Russell Weintraub for this observation.
36 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
37 Id. at 87-94.  Since then, of course, bargaining over warranty and to a point
remedy has become standard, as durable goods manufacturers realized the huge potential profits
from competition (though, at least in the auto industry, not until foreign competition obliged
them to act).  One could ask whether unbalanced bargaining power is an appropriate basis for
unconscionability.  See Alan Schwartz, Seller Unequal Bargaining Power and the Judicial
Process, 49 IND. L.J. 367, 385 & n. 41 (1974).  For a thorough treatment of the contrary position,
see Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power (July 29, 2004), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=570705.
38 See, e.g., Eric Posner, Contract Laws in the Welfare State: A Defense of the
Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract,
24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283 (1995).
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A. Resources
To start with the obvious – a typical consumer does not have the resources of a typical
business, leaving aside Warren Buffett, Bill Gates, and other especially prosperous folk.  This has
a few consequences.  We may group these by whether they affect market power, financing and
risk, or information, each with its own regulatory scheme.  
That an individual consumer lacks market power may matter little in a competitive market. 
In a reasonably responsive market, consumer desires should shortly appear in price or terms.  This
may not be true in monopoly or oligopoly, though.34  American antitrust law reflects this in its
focus on consumer welfare.35  Sometimes antitrust notions inform consumer law as well.  A
notable example is Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,36 in which the court used unconscionability
to invalidate a remedies limitation, largely because of the inability to secure better terms resulting,
it held, from the oligopolistic auto market.37  To some degree, usury laws and the like may also
reflect a concern about exploitation and rent exaction in credit markets.38
The consumer also lacks the merchant’s ability to spread risk cost-effectively.  In
particular, self-insurance is not nearly as good an option for an individual as for a business.  With
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
39 On the susceptibility of individuals to relatively modest reversals in fortune, see
TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN, & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE
MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT (2000).
40 Namely, Gilbert & Sullivan’s Utopia, Limited.
41  Thus, for instance, in 2003 there were 1,660,245 individual bankruptcies and only
35,037 business bankruptcies, not in proportion to the people and businesses in the U.S. 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy Filings Up for Calendar Year 2003, at 1
(Feb. 25, 2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/pr02252004.pdf.
42 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 117 (6th ed. 2003).
43 See, e.g., Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory
Lending?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2002).
44 As in the Federal Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq.
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fewer transactions, the consumer cannot assume that routine fluctuations will average smoothly. 
With fewer assets, the consumer cannot assume that she will be able to weather an unusually bad
bit of luck well.39  Consumers can and do buy third-party insurance, as do businesses, but even
then the types of insurance and their costs vary greatly.  Some consumers are able to contract on
favorable terms because their employers or their unions provide the bargaining power, and some
get subsidized insurance of some types, mainly for personal injury.  For economic loss or property
loss, however, subsidies are relatively rare, and businesses may be able to secure superior rates.
Individuals also may be more prone to liquidity crunches.  We cannot float our own
commercial paper issues or sell stock in ourselves, except in the world of operetta.40  Nor do many
of us have credit lines on which we can draw readily.  To be sure, consumers have access to credit
cards, which provide potentially huge unsecured credit lines, and home equity loans and the like
can increase one’s liquidity.  Still, the individual bankruptcy rate exceeds the business bankruptcy
rate, which follows from the greater susceptibility of consumers to fluctuations in financial status
and to risk generally.41
This problem is dealt with to some degree by consumer law.  Many regulatory statutes
focus on consumer credit.  Usury laws limit interest rates in some types of loans in order to keep
consumers from entering into potentially dangerous financial arrangements, though perhaps at the
cost of limiting their liquidity.42  So too, with less effect, do laws on payday loans and the like.43 
Another strand of consumer law requires that the terms, especially interest rates and repayment
terms, be laid out clearly and uniformly.44  This has a number of causes, some to be discussed later
under information.  Here, though, plain and readily comparable information should in principle
allow consumers to choose soundly among credit providers.  Hence as well the current efforts on
the part of credit card lenders and others to change the bankruptcy laws in order to make discharge
harder.
More important is the relative smallness of the consumer as market participant. 
http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/art1
45 See, e.g., Acevedo v. Start Plastics, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 808, 812-13 (E.D. Pa.
1993); Frantz v. Cantrell, 711 N.E.2d 856, 859 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); Dixon v. Roberts, 853 P.2d
235, 238 (Okla. Ct. App. 1993); Fred J. Moore, Inc. v. Schinmann, 700 P.2d 754, 756-57 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1985).
46 See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 8, at 8-15.  Access to information will be
developed further below in Part II.B.
47 U.S. Census Bureau, Statistics about Business Size (including Small Business)
from the Census Bureau at table 3 (Aug. 2004), available at
http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/smallbus.html (1992 data showing median gross receipts of
just over $250,000 per year).
48 See, e.g., JUSTIN G. LONGENECKER ET AL., SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT: AN
ENTREPRENEURIAL EMPHASIS 239 (7th ed. 2000) (79% of fastest-growing small firms in the U.S.
used personal savings to start their businesses; no other source was used by more than 16%).
49 On credit card use, see, e.g., JONATHAN A. SCOTT ET AL., CREDIT, BANKS AND
SMALL BUSINESS – THE NEW CENTURY 27-30 (2003), available at
http://www.nfib.com/PDFs/sbpoll/NewCentury.pdf.
50 Id. at 59.
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Consumers engage in some transactions often, developing expertise with price, quality, and the
like.  There they stand more or less on par with merchants, and may even be superior (though, of
course, the merchants in their non-mercantile capacity are consumers).  Other transactions may
happen once in a year, a decade, or a lifetime.  There is no chance to amortize information costs
over a number of transactions.  The same goes for legal advice.  In contrast, merchants are
classically repeat players – indeed, occasional sellers often are not considered merchants.45  By
definition, then, they have more transactions from which they can gather information and over
which they can spread the costs of getting information.46
From the vantage of resources, small businesses are closer to consumers than large
businesses under any normal definition of small businesses.  Two observations may anchor this
discussion.  First, the median business in the U.S. – not just small business – has gross receipts of
less than half a million dollars per year.47  Second, most small businesses are financially entwined
with their founders.  The founders typically put up most of the money to start the business, taking
some combination of equity and debt in exchange.48  To finance the business, the founders will
often mortgage their homes, draw down their savings, and use their personal credit cards.49  Even
should the business borrow from a bank, the bank will often require that the founders guarantee
the loan with their personal assets.50  In short, small businesses resemble in many ways
overextended consumers.  
This has many consequences.  Small firms cannot self-insure as effectively as large
businesses, so they cannot spread risk as effectively across their transactions.  They can seek to
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51 Small wonder, then, that a recent survey of small business owners showed that the
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Washington, D.C.), Sept. 2003, at 15, available at
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52 See, e.g., WILLIAM A. MACPHEE, SHORT-TERM BUSINESS BORROWING: SOURCES,
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53 To name two: (1) Short-form registration forms are available for stock issues by
businesses with revenues of less than twenty-five million dollars per year.  17 C.F.R. §§ 228.20
et seq.,  230.405 (2004).  (2) Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501 et seq. (2004), among other
things, exempts small issuers from registration for issues less than one million dollars in any
twelve months, and allows for exemption for up to five million dollars where the investor pool
and means of solicitation are somewhat restricted.  See generally 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN,
SECURITIES REGULATION §§ 3.4[4][D], 4.15, 4.17, 4.20-4.22 (4th ed. 2002); Mark A. Sargent,
The New Regulation D: Deregulation, Federalism and the Dynamics of Regulatory Reform, 68
WASH. U. L.Q. 225 (1990).
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buy insurance, but they may not be able to get the same rates as larger firms, whether because of
greater uncertainty on the part of the insurer or because of the need by the insurer to recover fixed
underwriting costs.  For those reasons, they may be unable to get some types of insurance, such as
product liability insurance, at affordable rates.51  In addition, they cannot amortize legal, planning,
and research costs over as many transactions, lacking economies of scale, so they may not operate
on the same level of sophistication as their larger competitors.  
Smaller size poses many financial problems as well.  Small firms have poorer access to
credit markets.  Some types of credit, such as commercial paper, are not available to them in part 
because the costs of an issue are too high for the amount of money it would produce.52  Much the
same is true for the equity market.  Public issues are prohibitively expensive for small and even
medium-sized firms, even after recent SEC rule changes that ease smaller offerings.53  In any case,
many small firms would prefer to avoid the double taxation that attaches to dividends, which
effectively forecloses most equity placements.  Nor do other lenders make up the difference.  Both
theory and practice show that the combination of imperfect information and adverse selection will
http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/art1
54 For fuller discussions of credit rationing, see, e.g., Amy C. Bushaw, Small
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Credit and Financial Collapse, 101 Q.J. ECON. 454, 467-69 (1986). 
56 HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR xxiv (2d ed. 1957) (emphasis in
original).
57 For representative summaries and analyses of Simon’s work, see, e.g., HERBERT
A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY (1982); Herbert A. Simon, Rationality in
Psychology and Economics, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN PSYCHOLOGY AND
ECONOMICS 25 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1987); Sidney G. Winter,
Satisficing, Selection, and the Innovating Remnant, 85 Q.J. ECON. 237 (1971).
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cause lenders to ration credit, so that borrowers cannot borrow up to the point that their interest
rate equals their expected rate of return.54  Thus, like consumers, small businesses are especially
susceptible to sudden shocks – particularly problems that beset the proprietor, but not
necessarily.55  
B. Information
Here we have two questions – whether information is available at all and what the cost is
for the available information. As Herbert Simon has observed, both information and its
assimilation are costly, so we must make decisions based on incomplete information.  This does
not mean that we act irrationally.  As Simon put it, we are “intendedly rational, but only limitedly
so.”56  Hence his idea of bounded rationality.57  In order to make reasonably good decisions, we
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take cognitive shortcuts that bring us to more or less acceptable results.58  We cannot expect to
reach perfection, except by happenstance, but we can reach results that at least meet some
predetermined level of satisfaction – in other words, we satisfice, again to use Simon’s term.59  As
a corollary to this, the more costly the information is to acquire or process, the further from
perfection will be the level of satisficing.  If information is dear and thus scarce, we will
economize on it, relying more on these heuristics and increasing the likelihood and magnitude of
error.
With bounded rationality in mind, compare consumers and merchants.  In general,
consumers have less information than merchants.  True, Consumer Reports and its Internet
counterparts – Epinions and that ilk – provide much information to the moderately savvy
consumer buyer.  Experience, one’s own or that of friends, will add more anecdotal evidence.  But
much product quality information is difficult to get – some impossible, unless one has access to a
testing laboratory.  In contrast, a seller will know all about its own products, whether through its
own testing or through feedback from its buyers.  Merchants who buy products in large quantities
will not have quite as much information as will their sellers, but they will still have more than do
relatively infrequent buyers.  Such information as design problems, failure rate, and magnitude of
failure may thus be difficult or impossible for a consumer to assess accurately, though less so for a
merchant buyer and still less for a merchant seller.  Likewise, consumers may know little of value
about the reliability of a retailer.  Again, anecdote may help, as will some personal experience. 
Especially in these days of remote purchasing via the Internet, though, reputation can be difficult
to monitor or affect.60  Despite imperfect information and imperfect assimilation, though,
consumers must still consume.  This may yield tolerable but imperfect buying choices, and
sometimes intolerable ones.
Another area where information becomes relevant is contract terms.  In mass-market
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Legal Ease and ‘Legalese’, 6 PSYCHOL., CRIME & L. 1 (2000) (reviewing studies of, e.g., jury
instructions and statutes).
63 See, e.g., Jeffrey Davis, Protecting Consumers from Overdisclosure and
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transactions, these seldom if ever are drafted by the buyer.61  The terms are often obscurely
written.  A good many studies of reading levels show that common form contract language is
understandable only by those with graduate degrees, not a fair description of most consumers.62 
We thus find that those who enter into these contracts understand little of what they have signed.63 
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Shuptrine, Warranty Coverage: How Important In Purchasing an Automobile?, in MARKETING:
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Nor does it make sense for a consumer to hire a lawyer as interpreter.  The cost of a lawyer greatly
exceeds the whole value of most consumer transactions, much less the value of whatever a lawyer
could bring to the transaction.64  And, of course, most contracts are performed in full, making a
lawyer cost-ineffective even for common or big-ticket consumer contracts, the purchase of a home
possibly excepted.65  A consumer might also wonder whether learning the details of the terms
would help her choose a product more wisely. After all, one typically cannot negotiate for better
terms with the seller or manufacturer, and one may doubt that a thorough search would yield
materially better terms.66  Indeed, given the costs of reading and the normally modest value of
making the effort, it is little wonder that consumers routinely sign contracts unread.67  
In contrast, a merchant as seller will be able to draft helpful language and can hire a lawyer
to do so, spreading its cost over a good many transactions.  Thanks to the battle of the forms,68 the
merchant buyer also has incentives to do so.  Even apart from these, the merchant may develop
internal expertise in contract language.  It also may be able to take advantage of relational norms
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70 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2000) (FTC cease-and-desist orders); 21 U.S.C. §
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to secure reasonable terms that may not be available to single-shot market participants such as
consumers, though of course a reputation among consumers for hard dealing may be costly.69
Consumer law deals with information cost and quality variously.  At the extreme, many
agencies maintain minimum standards and prevent the sale of products not meeting them – the
Food and Drug Administration, the Federal Trade Commission, the Consumer Product Safety
Commission, and so forth.70  By providing a means of enforcing minimum quality, however
imperfect, the most hazardous of market failures can be guarded against with little information
cost to the consumer.  Other consumer rules try to lower the cost of information, rather than
correct for its cost by absolute bans.  Plain language statutes do this, particularly for insurance
contracts.71  Other statutes use simplified forms.  Article Nine of the U.C.C., for instance, contains
safe-harbor forms for creditors giving their debtors notice of a planned disposition of the
collateral.  The form for non-consumer transactions is more technical and less complete than the
form for consumer transactions.72  Still other statutes require that certain facts or terms be laid out
conspicuously, which reduces a consumer’s burden in getting the information.  In sales law
written disclaimers of warranties must be conspicuous.73   So too must Truth-In-Lending Act
disclosures of such things as annual percentage rate and finance charge.74  Cooling-off statutes
also may indirectly help with information.75  One of their effects is to allow a buyer to look harder
at the transaction and gather more facts before committing to it irrevocably.  Finally, many
regulations require that sellers disclose information ranging from fat content to octane to tire tread
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to casket price.76  All of these seek to lower the costs of acquiring or processing the most
important information, thus raising the quality of the decisions made.  Indeed, one could argue
that lowering informational asymmetry has been a prime goal of modern consumer law, even
more so than the substantive regulation of contract terms.77
On the other side, consider, for instance, the harsh formation rules found in CISG, an
almost unadulterated last shot approach.78  These assume that those involved in international
transactions read their forms or are willing to live with the consequences.  This may be unrealistic,
and it may in part be driven by a desire for certainty – after all, it is not the law of most parties to
CISG – but it can explained at least in part by this assumption of informed business practice. 
Additionally, to some degree the U.C.C. implied warranty of merchantability79 rests on
assumptions about information.  In part it assumes that the merchant seller has superior
information about product defect and so should be obliged to divulge some to the buyer in the
form of disclaimers (hence, the merchantability warranty as an information-forcing default rule).80 
In part it assumes that the buyer from a merchant needs the clear signal of something less than a
merchantability warranty, and thus provides for disclaimer under some modest constraints.81
Once again, small businesses fall somewhere in the middle, but often more closely
resemble consumers than large businesses.  As noted, a small business cannot amortize its costs of
acquiring information over as many transactions as can a large business.  Given a competitive
market, then, it will face pressure to acquire less information.  It also will generate less internally. 
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82 There are plausible reasons to retain even the hoariest forms, though.  See, e.g.,
Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts Are Written in “Legalese,” 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59 (2001).
83 Robert H. Brockhaus & Walter R. Nord, An Exploration of Factors Affecting the
Entrepreneurial Decision: Personal Characteristic vs. Environmental Conditions, 39 PROC.
ANN. MEETING ACAD. MGMT. 364, 366 (1979).  See also BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T
OF COMMERCE, 1992 ECONOMIC CENSUS: CHARACTERISTICS OF BUSINESS OWNERS 72, 74 (1997)
(owners of small firms less well educated than owners of large firms).
84 Though somewhat better educated.  See 1992 ECONOMIC CENSUS, supra; see also,
e.g., George W. Haynes & Charles Ou, A Profile of Owners and Investors of Privately Held
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-20-
Fewer transactions mean less feedback, which may be vital to get information about relatively
infrequent events.  This is not always true, of course.  Some small businesses are small because
they do only one thing, but over and over.  They would thus develop a great deal of expertise in
that one thing.  Still other small businesses come about because the founders are very expert in the
pertinent field and wish to exploit their special skills.  Even then, the small firm may be unable to
afford sufficiently sophisticated information about other issues. 
Legal issues may be high among those neglected.  Given form contracting, the likely
ubiquity of boilerplate terms, and the fairly high probability that any particular contract will be
performed, it would not make sense for a small merchant to hire a lawyer to scrutinize all
contracts.  A small merchant might sensibly hire a lawyer to draft its own forms.  Still, the
proliferation of inexpensive forms on CD-ROM may cause small firms to use these with minimal
adaptation.  Often these forms, though adequate for general purposes, do not suffice for the uses to
which they are put.  Nor is it likely that a small merchant will hire the most sophisticated legal
counsel when she does seek assistance.  Just as with product information or market information,
the costs of legal information must be spread across fewer transactions, which justifies lower legal
costs and, to the extent the market works, inferior legal advice.
How small businesses assimilate information is also important.  If a firm cannot
comprehend the information it receives, then it may well be worse off with the information than
without.  Consider, for example, formal contracting.  Many stock contracts are written obscurely,
whether on purpose or out of tradition or sloth.82  Small businesspeople, like consumers, may be
unable to understand contract provisions and may not be able to afford lawyers to explain them.
Nor are small businesses entirely free from the welter of regulations and reports that flood modern
businesses, not all of them drafted with clarity in mind. Demographic studies of small
businesspeople show that they are somewhat less well educated than corporate managers – by
about two years, in one study,83 and not too far removed from the population as a whole.84 
Moreover, they tend to hire people less educated than the employees of large firms.85  These data
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value most.  Unless one underbids by enough to allow for this sort of error, winning can be worse
than losing.  This has been demonstrated in a range of contexts, including bids for oil rights. 
RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE 50-62 (1992); see also, e.g., Larry T. Garvin,
Disproportionality and the Law of Consequential Damages: Default Theory and Cognitive
Reality, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 339, 392-94 (1998) (describing effect of random error on risk pricing).
87 A point made by a number of authors.  See, e.g., Garvin, supra note 86, at 394-97;
Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market
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paint far too broadly, of course.  High-tech firms are hardly the same as gas stations or janitorial
firms, either in the typical education of the owner or of the employees.  On balance, though, small
business owners and their key employees look much more like the general population than do
corporate middle managers, and will thus be more prone than larger firms to information
problems.
C. Cognition
The section above does not assume perfect rationality, but, as the quote from Simon
suggests, it assumes that actors are as rational as they can afford to be.  But what if economic
actors make systematic errors when dealing with information?  Should all actors make the same
errors, perhaps there would be little economic result.86  If some actors make more mistakes than
others, though, there is room for market failure, with those less prone to error taking advantage of
those more prone.87  Supplying more information, the usual remedy of consumer law, may thus
prove ineffective.88
By now cognitive psychology and experimental economics are very well established, as a
look at recent Nobel Prizes in economics will show.89  The experimental literature has shown
many departures from conventional expected utility theory – enough to warrant the comment that
http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/art1
90 PAUL ANAND, FOUNDATIONS OF RATIONAL CHOICE UNDER RISK 19 (1993); see
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Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and
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REV. 1051 (2000).
92 See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 65; William N. Eskridge, One Hundred Years of
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REV. 1203 (2003) [hereinafter Korobkin, Unconscionability]; Paul Bennett Marrow, Crafting a
Remedy for the Naughtiness of Procedural Unconscionability, 34 CUMB. L. REV. 11 (2003-
2004); Robert Prentice, Contract-Based Defenses in Securities Fraud Litigation: A Behavioral
Analysis, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 337 (2003); Silber, supra note 88.
93 Others have, most importantly Gregory Mitchell. Gregory Mitchell, Case Studies,
Counterfactuals, and Causal Explanations, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1517 (2004); Gregory Mitchell,
Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral
Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907 (2002) [hereinafter Mitchell, Pessimism];
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Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1781 (2003); Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect
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The Future of Behavioral Law and Economics, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1765 (1998); Ward Edwards &
Detlof von Winterfeldt, Cognitive Illusions and Their Implications for the Law, 59 S. CAL. L.
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if expected utility theory “is an empirical, testable theory, then it is, in any conventional sense,
untrue.”90  Though legal academics took a decade or so to begin using their findings at all
regularly, for the last ten or fifteen years this has become relatively common, with many books
and symposia devoted to both methodological explorations and specific applications.91  Contract
law has not been immune.92  Nor should it.  After all, much of contracting is risk allocation, an
area particularly prone to cognitive error.  Given the present ubiquity of behavioral law and
economics, to use the field’s most common name, I shall not rehearse problems of method.93  For
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STAN. L. REV. 1551 (1998); Tanina Rostain, Educating Homo Economicus: Cautionary Notes on
the New Behavioral Law and Economics Movement, 34 L. & SOC’Y REV. 973 (2000); Robert E.
Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603, 1639-
46 (2000).
In relegating the critiques to a stringcite, I do not wish to brush them aside.  Not all the
heuristics and biases affect most people; not all populations are equally susceptible to these
biases; not all of the effects are especially great; not all of the more robust and widespread effects
are immutable.  To some extent this Article deals with these critiques, especially the last.  In the
main, though, the more detailed critiques of method and substance properly belong in discussions
of specific proposals for law reform, not in a discussion of a general analytic approach.  For now,
it is enough to point out the fairly strong evidence for cognitive error over a range of populations
and behavioral functions.
94 See, e.g., Michael Hertzel et al., Long-Run Performance Following Private
Placements of Equity, 57 J. FIN. 2595 (2002) (overoptimism about prospects of firms issuing
equity); Don A. Moore et al., Positive Illusions and Forecasting Errors in Mutual Fund
Investment Decisions, 79 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 95 (1999) (MBA students
in simulation); Arnold S. Wood, Behavioral Risk: Anecdotes and Disturbing Evidence, J.
INVESTING, Spring 1997, at 8.
95 See, e.g., John C. Easterwood & Stacey R. Nutt, Inefficiency in Analysts’
Earnings Forecasts: Systematic Misreaction or Systematic Optimism?, 54 J. FIN. 1777 (1999).
96 See, e.g., KENNETH R. MACCRIMMON & DONALD A. WEHRUNG, TAKING RISKS
99, 194-95, 260-65 (1986); Leslie E. Palich & D. Ray Bagby, Using Cognitive Theory to Explain
Entrepreneurial Risk-Taking: Challenging Conventional Wisdom, 10 J. BUS. VENTURING 425
(1995).
97 See, e.g., Richard Z. Gooding et al., Fixed Versus Variable Reference Points in
the Risk-Return Relationship, 29 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 331 (1996) (business over-optimism
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the sake of illustration, this Article will mention several of the more common heuristics and
biases, along with how they apply to contracting and its regulation, before turning to how
consumers and merchants might exhibit them differently.
1. Some pertinent cognitive failings
a. Over-optimism and overconfidence
Over-optimism is one of the more robust cognitive errors.  It shows up in many, many
populations: investors,94 investment analysts,95 entrepreneurs,96 businesses,97 and consumers,98 to
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98 See, e.g., W. KIP VISCUSI & WESLEY A. MAGAT, LEARNING ABOUT RISK 94-95
(1987) (3% of consumers think their homes pose a higher than average risk to a child of
poisoning with drain cleaner).
99 For a few more studies of different populations, see, e.g., K. Patricia Cross, Not
Only Can, But Will College Teaching be Improved?, 17 NEW DIRS. FOR HIGHER ED. 1 (1977)
(94% of college professors think they are better than average); Patricia Delhomme, Comparing
One’s Driving with Others’: Assessment of Abilities and Frequency of Offences. Evidence for a
Superior Conformity of Self-Bias?, 23 ACCIDENT ANAL. & PREVENTION 493 (1991) (drivers);
Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Susceptibility to Health Problems: Conclusions
from a Community-Wide Sample, 10 J. BEHAV. MED. 481 (1987) (general population on
susceptibility to health problems); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life
Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806 (1980) (college students on likelihood of
owning homes, divorcing, drinking excessively, and liking their jobs).  For a survey of the over-
optimism literature, see Neil D. Weinstein, Optimistic Bias About Personal Risks, 246 SCIENCE
1232 (1989). 
100 See, e.g., R.M. Cambridge & R.C. Shreckengost, Are You Sure? The Subjective
Probability Assessment Test (CIA 1978), described in Sarah Lichtenstein et al., Calibration of
Probabilities: The State of the Art to 1980, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS
AND BIASES 306, 314 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter JUDGMENT] (CIA
analysts); Stuart Oskamp, Overconfidence in Case-Study Judgments, in JUDGMENT at 287
(psychologists); Andrea O. Baumann et al., Overconfidence among Physicians and Nurses: The
‘Micro-Certainty, Macro-Uncertainty’ Phenomenon, 32 SOC. SCI. MED. 167 (1991) (physicians
and nurses).  It should be added that the least able tend to be the most overconfident, which is
less than comforting.  See, e.g., Justin Kruger & David Dunning, Unskilled and Unaware of It:
How Difficulties in Recognizing One’s Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments, 77
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1121 (1999).  The evidence for this bias has been challenged
as an experimental artifact.  Robyn M. Dawes & Matthew Mulford, The False Confidence Effect
and Overconfidence: Flaws in Judgment or Flaws in How We Study Judgment?, 65 ORG.
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name but a few.99  Its effect upon risk allocation is obvious and potentially severe.  An over-
optimistic consumer may underestimate the likelihood that a product will fail or that a seller will
not honor its warranty or otherwise fix the problem.  As a result, that consumer may pay too much
for the quality part of the goods package.  Along the same lines, a borrower may be too optimistic
about her chances of paying back a loan, and thus may not worry much about high penalties or
strict default covenants.
Closely related is overconfidence.  Again, many populations show overconfidence, even
those whose expertise should lend immunity.100  Consumers are certainly in this realm.101  So are
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BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 201 (1996).  The regression effects they point to, though,
have been controlled for in at least some studies – for instance, that of Kruger and Dunning,
supra – and overconfidence remains.  See also, e.g., Dale W. Griffin & Carol A. Varey, Towards
a Consensus on Overconfidence, 65 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 227 (1996)
(questioning Dawes & Mulford’s analysis).
101 See, e.g., PETER ASCH, CONSUMER SAFETY REGULATION 76 (1988) (97% of
consumers think themselves better than average in ability to avoid bicycle and mower accidents).
102 See, e.g., Colin Camerer & Dan Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An
Experimental Approach, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 306 (1999) (business entrants); Pekka Hietala et al.,
What is the Price of Hubris? Using Takeover Battles to Infer Overpayments and Synergies, 32
FIN. MGMT. 5 (2003) (Viacom’s takeover of Paramount); Mark Kritzman et al., Risk, Regimes,
and Overconfidence, 8 J. DERIVATIVES 32 (2001) (global stock and bond returns); J. Edward
Russo & Paul J.H. Schoemaker, Managing Overconfidence, 33 SLOAN MGMT. REV., Winter
1992, at 7 (corporate managers); James Scott et al., Overconfidence Bias in International Stock
Prices, 29 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 80 (2003) (international stock returns).  But see Erich Kirchler &
Boris Maciejovsky, Simultaneous Over- and Underconfidence: Evidence from Experimental
Asset Markets, 25 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 65 (2002) (finding full range of confidence
approaches in experimental markets).
103 On the relation of overconfidence to over-optimism, see, e.g., Colin F. Camerer,
Individual Decision Making, in HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 587, 594-95 (John H.
Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995); Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding
Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT, supra note 100, at 463, 468-70; Madsen, supra note 97, at 589-90;
see also, e.g., Hart Blanton et al., Overconfidence as Dissonance Reduction, 37 J. EXPT’L SOC.
PSYCHOL. 373 (2001) (relating overconfidence to dissonance reduction).
104 Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker
Perceptions of Legal Protections in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105 (1997); Pauline
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investors and businesspeople.102 Overconfidence can cause over-optimism through a number of
mechanisms – possibly by overestimating the probability that one is correct and thus
underweighting remote risks, possibly by assigning too low a variance to one’s probability
distributions and thus taking too few precautions, possibly by overvaluing one’s own limited
experience and ignoring remote and unfamiliar harms.103  Whatever the link, overconfidence can
also be a problem apart from over-optimism.  It can combine with limited information in
peculiarly dangerous ways.  An overconfident person may assume understanding that isn’t
actually present.  Thus, when faced with incomprehensible form language, an overconfident
person may charge ahead imprudently, thinking that the forms grant protections they don’t
actually provide – a phenomenon shown in studies of contracting behavior.  For instance, Pauline
Kim has found that most at-will employees think they can be discharged only for cause, employee
handbooks and the common law notwithstanding.104 In another vein, overconfidence may cause
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WANT 118-22 (1999).  One could interpret these data otherwise – for instance, as supporting
either a cynical view of the world or a realistic one, the latter taking into account internal
grievance procedures that grant some rights even to at-will employees.  See Cynthia L. Estlund,
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15-19 (2002).
105 Steven Pressman, On Financial Frauds and Their Causes: Investor
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106 Paul C. Nutt, The Formulation Processes and Tactics Used in Organizational
Decision Making, 4 ORG. SCI. 226, 247 (1993).
107 Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. BUS. 197
(1986).
108 Barbara Combs & Paul Slovic, Newspaper Coverage of Causes of Death, 56
JOURNALISM Q. 837, 843 (1979).
109 See, e.g., Sarah Lichtenstein et al., Judged Frequency of Lethal Events, 4 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. LEARNING & MEMORY 551, 551, 553 (1978); Paul Slovic et al.,
Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT, supra note 100, 463, 466-67.
110 Werner F.M. De Bondt & Richard H. Thaler, Do Security Analysts Overreact?, 80
AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROC. 52, 52 (1990).
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one not to seek out more information, even when more information is available and cheap.  It has
been suggested that this may favor financial fraud,105 poor organizational decision making,106 and
inefficient takeover decisions.107
b. Availability
Another important bias is availability, the tendency to rely to excess on vivid information,
whether pertinent or not.  This has a rational basis.  If information is costly, we might do well to
use all the cheap information we can get.  Vivid information also may be vivid because it is
important.  But much vivid information is largely irrelevant, and much important information is
dull – yet we tend to assign greater weight to what is vivid.  So, for instance, how we see the
frequencies of various hazards correlates with the amount and vividness of newspaper reporting
about them more than with their actual frequencies.108  Similarly, we tend to underestimate the
likelihood of drab causes of death like diabetes and overestimate the likelihood of striking causes
of death like earthquakes.109  Turning to the business world, security analysts also give too much
weight to vivid information.110  
Of course, some information about risk is vivid and some is not, as is true of information
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THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957).  More recent surveys include, e.g., ELLIOT
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114 See, e.g., Linda Simon et al., Trivialization: The Forgotten Mode of Dissonance
Reduction, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 247 (1995).
115 Arnold C. Cooper et al., Entrepreneurs’ Perceived Chances for Success, 3 J. BUS.
VENTURING 97, 106 (1988).
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generally about the matter of a contract.  Once one has experienced a remote risk, availability
suggests it will be overvalued.111  This suggests that availability may warrant little intervention for
relatively common transactions, where consumers are likely to know of and respond to potential
harms.  In contrast, availability needs some attention where the risk of harm is drab or its
frequency low, in light of both the likelihood of the harm and the frequency of the transaction.  
c. Cognitive dissonance
Dissonance reduction also has effects on market behavior.  When we must choose, we may
feel cognitive dissonance, for we may choose wrongly.112   We can reduce this discomfort by
trying to validate our decision.  If we made the right choice, this is innocent enough, and even
makes us happier and thus better off.  If not, though, our attempts to reduce dissonance can make
it harder to recognize our errors and thus to change course, yielding bad decision-making and
lower utility.113  We lower dissonance in many ways.  Sometimes we overemphasize what is good
about our decision and underemphasize what is good about the choice not made.  We might also
give more weight to bad things about the other choice, while giving little to similar information
about our own.  There are many other techniques: remembering silly arguments in favor of the
rejected choice, searching for information supporting the choice made, finding new virtues in
one’s choice (or even making vices into virtues), or others still.114
Dissonance aversion can have baneful economic consequences.  It has been suggested that
entrepreneurial overoptimism is caused by dissonance aversion, for once the entrepreneur has
made a risky decision, she will avoid the pain of confronting the resulting risk by bolstering her
decision after the fact.115  This will stand in the way of changing course should the initial decision
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116 See, e.g., J. Edward Russo et al., Predecisional Distortion of Product Information,
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117 See, e.g., Terry L. Boles & David M. Messick, A Reverse Outcome Bias: The
Influence of Multiple Reference Points on the Evaluation of Outcomes and Decisions, 61 ORG.
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118 This cognitive bias thus meshes with dissonance avoidance.  Regret is among the
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FESTINGER, CONFLICT, DECISION, & DISSONANCE 97-112 (1964); Thomas Gilovich & Victoria
Husted Medvec, The Experience of Regret: What, When, and Why, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 379, 387-
88 (1995).
119 Maurice Allais, Le Comportement de l’Homme Rationnel devant le Risque:
Critique des Postulats et Axiomes de l’Ecole Americaine, 21 ECONOMETRICA 503, 527 (1953).
120 See, e.g., Faith Gleicher et al., The Role of Counterfactual Thinking in Judgments
of Affect, 16 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 284 (1990); Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky, The Psychology of Preferences, SCI. AM., Jan. 1982, at 160, 173.  To be sure, people do
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prove imprudent, and may even lead to escalating one’s commitment inappropriately.  Indeed,
dissonance aversion starts even before a decision is made.  A good many studies have shown that
preliminary judgments cause one making a decision to narrow the range of information considered
in a way that enhances those early, tentative decisions.116  Consumers and other market
participants may thus be biased by the early introduction of misleading or unbalanced information. 
Rules requiring, not merely disclosure, but early disclosure, may help counteract this behavior.
d. Regret aversion
Regret aversion begins with the unremarkable observation that choosing entails rejection. 
We judge our decisions in part on their independent success and in part on how the other
alternatives would have fared.117  To avoid regret, we may adjust our preferences to lower the
value of the rejected options, even at a high cost.118  In the classic study, more people chose a
certain award of one hundred million francs to a gamble with a ten percent chance of winning five
hundred million francs, an eighty-nine percent chance of winning one hundred million francs, and
a one percent chance of winning nothing, even though the gamble is worth more than the
certainty.119  One might also see people favor inaction over action, as action is more likely to yield
regret.120  Still others might avoid counterfactual regret – worry about passing up a grand
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REV. 136, 145-46 (1986); Robert A. Prentice & Jonathan J. Koehler, A Normality Bias in Legal
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opportunity.121
Regret aversion, like dissonance aversion, may yield inflexibility; if one has devalued a
rejected option, one is less likely to revert to it when the original choice proves bad.  In addition,
because regret in the short run tends to stem from errant action, regret aversion exerts steady
pressure in favor of the status quo.  This means that merchants who modify contracts are less
likely to see clients leave than is entirely desirable from the client’s perspective.  Thus, for
instance, credit card companies that offer low introductory rates, but raise rates and fees sharply
after, are likely to retain a surprising number of their customers.
e. Status quo bias and endowment effect
Next is the status quo bias – our tendency to prefer the way things are to the way they
might be.122  In a wide range of contexts, people will take whatever is described as the current
state of affairs over alternatives, even when they might have preferred the alternatives were they
starting with a clean slate.  One particularly striking example comes from the insurance market. 
In the early 1980s, New Jersey and Pennsylvania gave drivers the option to purchase low-cost
insurance with limited rights of action.  In Pennsylvania the default choice was expanded
coverage; in New Jersey the default choice was limited coverage.  A supermajority of New
Jerseyites took limited coverage; most Pennsylvanians took expanded coverage.123  The same goes
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for retirement plans,124 health insurance plans,125 and corporate mergers.126
The endowment effect is a special case of the status quo bias, one focusing on property
rights.127  Under neoclassical theory, whether one owns an object or not should make no difference
in the value one sets on it.  A plethora of experiments, though, shows that ownership does make a
difference.  If we own an object, we tend to value it more highly than if we do not.  This
endowment effect was shown through now-classic experiments involving coffee mugs and lottery
tickets.  People given coffee mugs value them more highly than those given a roughly equivalent
amount of case and the opportunity to buy mugs.128  Relatedly, in a different experiment some of
the subjects were given lottery tickets and others cash.  The subjects were then given the chance to
sell what they had at a price of what the others had received.  The lottery ticket owners usually
kept the tickets; the cash holders usually kept the cash.  One or the other could be consistent with
conventional economic theory, but not both.129
The status quo bias and the endowment effect jointly suggest that default rules matter.  If
parties prefer to stick with the norm, they will not depart from the default even when it is in their
best interest to do so.130  Moreover, starting positions are likely to prove sticky.  Just as for regret
aversion, contracting parties are likely not to respond fully to the shifts of others.  It thus becomes
possible for one party to take advantage of the other’s predisposition for the status quo.
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f. Anchoring and adjustment
The final bias in this incomplete list is in some ways tied more to bounded rationality than
to these other cognitive errors.  A great deal of literature suggests that we estimate quantities or
probabilities by anchoring on some existing number and adjusting as the evidence requires.  This
allows us to economize on information by starting with some datum that we already have. 
Anchoring would not pose any problems if we adjusted enough.  The overwhelming evidence,
however, shows that we generally do not.131  For instance, in the classic study subjects were
shown a wheel of fortune.  The wheel was spun and yielded a number; as the wheel was rigged,
unknown to the subjects, it showed either ten or sixty-five.  The subjects were asked whether the
percentage of African countries in the United Nations was above or below whichever of ten or
sixty-five they had seen.  They were then asked what the exact percentage was.  Presumably their
answers should not have been affected by the apparently random number they had just seen
produced.  But they were.  People who had seen ten gave a median estimate of twenty-five
percent; people who had seen sixty-five gave a median estimate of forty-five percent.132  This
result holds even for extreme anchors, such as whether the average temperature in San Francisco
was greater or less than 558 degrees.133
Anchoring is commonly exploited in marketing.  One homely example comes in the
supermarket aisle.  Consumers buy more canned goods in supermarkets when the sign by the
goods says “limit twelve” than when it says “limit six” or when it gives no limit at all.134  They
also buy more when the price is put in terms of multiple units (for instance, six for three dollars)
than when it is put in terms of a single unit (for instance, fifty cents each).135  In other words,
consumers anchor on the information presented them in the store when they make buying
decisions, presumably adjusting insufficiently for their actual need.  The same may go for
advertised prices – “regularly $15, on sale for $9.99" and the like.  We may sense that the regular
price is a little high, but if in fact it is wildly high we may adjust our anchor insufficiently and
think the sale is much better than it actually is.
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2. Cognitive bias and consumer law
These biases are common and potentially disturbing, at least to those who cherish the
rational actor model.  A good deal of consumer law may be explained, not so much as an attempt
to overcome a want of resources or information, but as an attempt to correct for consumer bias.  A
number of examples appear above.  In addition, rules that make bad information vivid, like the
welter of warning labels on hazardous products, may dampen overoptimism.136  Disclosure rules
also can be explained in part as attempts to overcome a range of heuristics, most significantly
dissonance aversion and anchoring.  For the former, a canny seller might exploit dissonance
aversion by delaying bad news until late – after the buyer has made some commitment to the
purchase and will discount the import of the tardy information.137  In many cases this might be
innocuous, but one can easily imagine that a buyer might get any number of unfavorable terms
late in the deal or even after the deal apparently has closed.  The form contract presented to the
buyer after the main terms are worked out may favor the seller wildly, but the buyer may not much
care – or, more to the point, may not care nearly as much as if the terms had been disclosed before
he had chosen to buy.138  
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In the same vein, a consumer might anchor on an appealing first bit of information and
adjust insufficiently as the merchant lets loose with less appealing information later.   Hence the
consumer laws that ensure disclosure up front.  Magnuson-Moss, for instance, requires that a
consumer product indicate what type of warranty it carries139 and requires that warranty
information be available to the buyer before purchase.140  The FTC used car rules likewise require
that the dealer disclose all warranties in a buyers guide placed on the vehicle.141   The Truth-in-
Lending Act requires that finance charges and interest rates be disclosed before credit is
extended142 and that they be calculated according to a statutory and regulatory formula.143   The
Consumer Leasing Act obliges those who lease to consumers to disclose to the lessee before the
lease is consummated such things as total payment amount, fees owed by the lessee, and costs at
the end of the lease.144  Comparative price advertising also must bear some relation to the truth, to
avoid manipulation of anchoring and adjustment; thus, a merchant advertising the former price of
discounted merchandise must list a price at which it in fact sold the goods.145
 
3. Small business, cognition, and the consumer-merchant dichotomy
We have so far seen that there is substantial evidence that human decision making departs
from the ideal of expected utility theory, that this behavior has implications for markets, and that a
good deal of the law granting consumers special status against merchants can be explained with
resort to cognition.  We thus must turn back to small business’s location in the consumer-
merchant divide, this time from the cognitive vantage.  To do so, though, we must look closely at
where these cognitive biases will tend to rest.
These biases, and many more like them, are very common among many different
populations.  Most of the work in this field, to be sure, studies college students in laboratory
settings.  Some have as a result objected that the results thus obtained may not exist when we look
http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/art1
146 See, e.g., Mitchell, Rationality, supra note 93, at 156-60.
147 See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, The Future of Behavioral Law and Economics, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1768-69 (1998).
148 See, e.g., Colin F. Camerer & Robin M. Hogarth, The Effects of Financial
Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework, 19 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 7 (1999); Anton Kühberger et al., Framing Decisions: Hypothetical and Real, 89
ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 1162 (2002); Mitchell, Rationality, supra note 93, at
114-19.
149 See, e.g., Katya Tentori et al., Wisdom and Aging: Irrational Patterns in College
Students but not Older Adults, 81 COGNITION B87 (2001).
150 On the tendency of self-serving biases to increase with age, see, e.g., Paul A.
Klaczynski & Billi Robinson, Personal Theories, Intellectual Ability, and Epistemological
Beliefs: Adult Age Differences in Everyday Reasoning Biases, 15 PSYCHOL. & AGING 400
(2000).
151 Wansink et al., supra note 134.
-34-
beyond callow youth, or, on the other hand, may be present to a greater extent when we look to
less educated or older populations.146  Even for this population, one might argue that these effects
may not be present at all in real life, where what we decide has real consequences.147  Others have
observed that the effects of real stakes are not so easily summed up, as the added concentration
that higher stakes logically would yield might attenuate some biases and exacerbate others.148  
These methodological objections would need a full article to deal with in the depth they
deserve.  We do need to address them here, though, because this Article’s conclusions rest on the
differences among classes of people in very real contexts.   First, studies of young people are not
illegitimate when we seek to examine consumer behavior.  Whatever else they are, college
students are consumers, and will continue to be consumers.  Certainly they are better educated
than many consumers outside the academy, but the steady increase in college degrees makes
college students more nearly typical than was true even a decade ago.  Their age is potentially
pertinent, true.  The limited studies of cognition by age are not unequivocal, but it should hardly
surprise us to discover that people learn from experience.149  What we learn is a question – after
all, we can learn cognitive error.150  So studies of college students should be taken with moderate
caution, but should not be discarded out of hand.  Much the same may be said of laboratory
studies.  Typically these do have modest stakes.  Many consumer decisions have similarly modest
stakes, though, perhaps neutralizing the objections based on the motivating effect of money. 
Moreover, there are plenty of studies for each of these heuristics and biases that use more
representative populations or look at behavior in the field.  More specifically, a great many studies
look at actual consumer behavior and find these heuristics and biases at work.  The study of
anchoring in supermarkets discussed earlier is an example.151  We see dissonance aversion in the
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tendency of new car buyers to look at more ads for the cars they bought and fewer for the cars they
decided against.152  Some studies have already been discussed, and more are in the margin.153
The same can be said for merchants.  Investors in mutual funds hang onto weak-
performing funds in order to avoid recognizing a bad decision, showing perhaps a mix of regret
aversion and dissonance aversion.154   To turn to another heuristic, real estate agents show
underadjustment when setting real estate prices,155 and auditors show anchoring to the preliminary
numbers given them by clients.156   A plethora of analyses of investor action cited earlier show a
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range of these biases.157  Many others do as well, both simulations and field studies.158  Perhaps
this should not surprise us; merchants are consumers when they are off-duty, and in any case
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presumably are raised as we all are and wired as we all are.159  
If these biases are found in both consumers and merchants, why should we care?  Won’t
they cancel out?  Sometimes they might.  The endowment effect may be an example.  If both
parties to a potential bargain overvalue what they have, perhaps a buyer will be a little reluctant to
deal, but ultimately the need for goods and services will win out.  There would be no particular
harm that would befall that buyer, in any case.  But what about overoptimism?  If both sellers and
buyers are overoptimistic, both will undervalue the risk of product failure.  As a result the seller
will price her goods too high, thinking them better than they are, and the buyer will be willing to
pay that price for the same reason.  The seller would hence be paid for a risk she had not assumed. 
Even more worrying, what if these biases are unevenly distributed between consumers and
merchants – in particular, what if merchants are less prone to them than consumers?  Then
merchants will be able to take advantage of their superior cognitive position more or less
systematically.160  In fact, there is a good deal of evidence to suggest that consumers do differ
from merchants, speaking very generally, despite every merchant’s dual role as consumer.  A look
at three ways to reduce cognitive error – selection, learning, and group decision-making –  shows
why this is so.  More important for us, these three ways to mitigate bias do not ordinarily align
small businesses with large businesses.  We thus derive support – qualified support, delimited
support, but support all the same – for the notion that small businesses may be treated inefficiently
by the consumer-merchant divide.
a. Selection
We should start by remembering that even the most nearly ubiquitous biases are not found
in everyone, and that those who display these biases do not do so to an equal degree.  It thus may
be possible for businesses to select managers who are less prone to these biases and who will thus
tend not to show them to the degree that consumers, by definition an unselected population,
would.161  This is especially likely if some identifiable groups are less prone to these biases than
others, which would make selecting these cognitive whizzes relatively easy.162  
There is some evidence that, intentionally or not, larger businesses tend to choose from
among the cognitive elect.  For instance, economics majors are less prone to many of these biases
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than are students in other majors.163  MBA students, though not as free from biases as economics
majors, generally come nearer the Bayesian ideal than do their less seasoned colleagues.164  This
may reflect greater statistical training than is common, for statistical training has been shown to
decrease the likelihood of a number of types of cognitive bias.165  Furthermore, business schools
have taken serious account of behavioral teachings.  Some books are devoted entirely to bringing
the heuristics and biases literature to bear on business decisions, generally with some discussion
about how these biases can be overcome.166  Other books, though dealing with decision making
more generally, consider this literature and debiasing methods.167  Even the quickest look through
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business school syllabi shows plentiful discussion of how to make decisions with less error.168 
These methods are relatively new to the curriculum, so we would not expect to see them fully
integrated in managerial decision making.169 To the extent they do affect how people behave,
though, whom will they affect most?  Large businesses tend to look to these pools when hiring
managers, MBAs in particular, so we would expect to see fewer biases in their policymakers than
in the rest of the world – that is, than in the consumer world.  Other methods of education yield
similar results.  Large firms train their employees, at least those with decision-making
responsibility, in the techniques of group decision-making and problem-solving.170   
Small businesses fall between these categories, but especially in their early stages are
much nearer consumers.  The typical small business, after all, has very few employees, and
probably the owners are the only real managers in the firm.171  Some company founders will have
been trained in business, of course.  Still, small business owners are on average not as well
educated as corporate middle managers.172  Eventually a growing firm will need managers who
stand between the company’s principals and its workers, and these managers will likely have
business training.  Early on, though, the typical small firm generally will not have the sort of
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managerial staff whose training may insulate it from cognitive error.173  Furthermore, when small
firms hire MBAs, they may well favor those with an entrepreneurial bent, thus bringing on
especially overconfident workers in precisely those management positions where their larger
counterparts have more nearly unbiased workers.174
Moreover, if we look directly at corporate middle managers, we see some evidence that in
fact they do not exhibit these biases to the same degree as the general population.  For example,
corporate managers are less risk-seeking than are people as a whole, and significantly less so than
entrepreneurs.175  This is not to say that corporate managers are free from bias.  Various studies of
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risk behavior on the part of managers show frequent departures from the Bayesian ideal.176  For
example, they show a degree of loss aversion or regret aversion that departs from the norm.177 
Still, as a group they do rather better than the average.178  Middle managers also are less
influenced by personality style than are top managers and react less vigorously to risk data.179  The
dominant personality type among middle managers thus seems somewhat less prone to bias than
many.180
In contrast, entrepreneurs differ in many ways from other businesspeople.181  A number of
studies have shown that entrepreneurs are more confident than non-entrepreneurs.182  They show
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greater propensity toward risk.183  They see less risk in ambiguous situations.184  They display
greater overconfidence and a greater tendency toward representativeness.185  They tend to favor
intuition and speculation over fact-driven analysis.186  These attributes are not without danger. 
Imprudence and overconfidence can yield reckless and costly decisions.  Still, it is so difficult to
launch a business and sustain it through the perilous early phase that overconfidence and risk-
seeking may be essential.187  The careful weighing of options may retard decisions that must be
made quickly.188  More fundamentally, successful entrepreneurs may need the sort of unequivocal
belief in their ideas that ordinary prudence would forestall.189  These attributes may well lead to
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entrepreneurial success, so the economy may on balance be better off if they are encouraged.190 
Given the high rate of entrepreneurial failure, though, perhaps the costs associated with them
should be mitigated.191
Additionally, larger firms may select through internal controls.  How principals control
their agents has provoked a huge literature.192  That they need to is fairly certain: agents, left
unconstrained, are likely to act in their own interests, not necessarily the interests of the firm. 
Thus businesses seek to align the interests of the firm and the individual – for instance, by issuing
stock options, or tying compensation to corporate profit.193  They may also police behavior that
suggests an inappropriate focus.  For instance, they can bar executives from owning stock in
competitors, suppliers, or customers.   Some of these constraints seek to prevent managers from
acting irrationally from the business’s vantage, and thus may effectively police cognitive error. 
Strategic planning might help mitigate some errors, in particular escalation.  But small firms tend
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not to plan strategically, certainly not to the degree that large firms do.194 Similarly, careful
quantitative analysis can reduce the likelihood that one will use an inaccurate heuristic.  Again,
though, small firms rely more on intuitive, rather than analytical, approaches to decision making,
which makes them more prone to heuristic errors.195
Consumers can put internal controls in place.  One way to increase savings is through
payroll deductions, for example.  These effectively subordinate our spending selves to our savings
selves.196  Still, it is not easy to police one’s self.  Sometimes institutions offer to help, at least for
a price.  As Richard Thaler has observed, buying a package deal for exercise or education
encourages one to make use of the pre-purchased opportunities, though perhaps in ways heedless
of the sunk cost fallacy.197   To some extent as well, consumers are not necessarily individuals. 
Many of us live in buying units – a family, a cooperative, a sorority.  In those, important decisions
are to a degree collective, and in theory can be made under internal constraints.  Whether they are
likely to is more speculative.  As we will see below, group decisions may be less sensible than
individual decisions.198  More to the point, it is hard to use internal controls to select in favor of or
against certain types of decisions or decision-makers.  The latter is impossible for a family and
difficult, reality television aside, in the others.  Any of these groups can in principle give decision-
making power to the most rational members.  This happens in families, very few of which hand
major decisions over to seven-year-old children.199  It may well happen in other groups as well,
though in a cooperative or other such group the choice of leader may be made without regard to
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the potential leaders’ pure Bayesian rationality.
Small businesses again more closely resemble consumers, at least until the businesses
grow large enough to require internal policing.  As long as the owner controls the firm, agency
cost issues may not be as significant as in publicly-held firms.  What’s good for Ma and Pa, Inc.,
is good for Ma and Pa, so there should be less of a need to align their interests by contract.200 
Once ownership becomes more diffuse, though, the interests of principal and agent may diverge
further.201  So too might they diverge when Ma and Pa hire an outsider to run some aspect of the
business.202  Until the owners and the managers separate so greatly that the former must police the
latter, though, the small business probably will not develop the limits that the large business must. 
Again, the small firm rests nearer the consumer than to the large firm.203
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b. Individual learning
First, the obvious: People can and do learn to avoid many types of cognitive error.  Though
not all types of error have shown themselves readily susceptible to elimination or, in the term of
art, debiasing, most that have been studied can at least be reduced.204  That people learn is hardly
surprising, whether one is inside or outside the academy.205  When and under what circumstances
they learn is not as obvious, though, and merits our attention.  If learning can readily be perfect,
then we need not worry about cognition, other than to arrange the law so that people will have
incentives to learn.206  Moreover, if consumers and merchants should learn in the same way and at
the same rate, then the behavioral case for intervening on behalf of the consumer is weaker.  To be
sure, we might still see individual differences that could require policing, and subgroups of
consumers might merit intervention.  For example, there is evidence that some, at least, of the
heuristics and biases are linked to general intelligence, which might suggest some need to protect
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the less bright.207  For that matter, if relatively savvy merchants could easily capitalize on the
cognitive errors of relatively biased consumers but not the reverse, then the market might not
wash out the errors and again the law might properly intervene.  These caveats aside, though, we
must look at the relative abilities of consumers and merchants to learn in order that we may situate
small businesses with regard to them.
A good place to start is the mechanics of learning.  This would seem unfruitful at first
glance.  After all, individuals learn, not businesses.  Insofar as businesses learn, they learn through
their workers.  Why should workers in their mercantile capacities behave differently than workers
in their individual capacities?  In fact, though, there are a number of reasons that firms may
acquire and use information differently than individuals.  Some have to do with collective
concerns that will be discussed below.208  Others, though, have to do with the means by which we
learn.  If large businesses make learning easier than it is for consumers, they might be expected to
take advantage of the fact; after all, there is at least mild economic pressure to behave rationally. 
Students of learning have pointed to several factors that are especially important.209  By looking at
these in turn, we can see whether they favor the sort of learning that takes place within large firms
and thus whether large firms are better able to learn to avoid cognitively dubious behavior.
i. Feedback
First, learning requires feedback. Not just any feedback will do.  The feedback must be
accurate, of course, or any learning will be warped.  It must also be close enough to the event that
the person receiving feedback will associate the feedback with the behavior producing the
feedback.210  Where decision-makers cannot readily trace history, they tend not to learn well when
faced with feedback delays.211  We thus see that weather forecasters, who receive accurate and
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immediate feedback daily and even hourly, are almost devoid of probabilistic error.212  But
feedback may hinder those who receive it.  Many heuristics and biases are learned. 
Overconfidence may arise from a self-attribution bias reinforced by apparent successes.213  Risk
aversion may be a response to negative feedback.214  Information, if filtered through a bias, may
thus do considerable cognitive harm.  We thus have two questions: first, who is likely to get
potentially useful information, and second, who is likely to use it helpfully or harmfully.
Consumers and large merchants differ materially in their access to feedback.  Large
merchants have so high a volume of transactions that they have the capacity to get useful feedback
for all but quite infrequent decisions or quite unlikely outcomes.215  They are also likely to gather
much information routinely, and very often they will seek it out and analyze it in sophisticated
ways.  Multivariate analysis and the like allow one to tease out particular causes for complex
phenomena, provided one has enough data to make the analysis fruitful.  Though complex data
analysis can be time-consuming, routine analysis can be very rapid indeed.  Consumers also get
feedback, but that feedback may not always be plentiful.  Many consumer transactions are
infrequent.  Even the more frequent ones may not provide useful feedback.  Evidence of product
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failure, for example, may come about months or years from the purchase.  By then, the consumer
may not be able to tell whether the product failed because it was badly designed, badly
manufactured, badly installed, or badly used.  The resulting feedback may be inaccurate and will
likely be ambiguous.216  Information is also more costly to secure and, per unit of information, to
process, as the economies of scale available to the large business are not as readily available to the
consumer.  Some are – Consumer Reports and the like – but much information useful to
consumers is proprietary.  Still other information is difficult to gather, in part because of the
number of variables involved.  Many consumer goods differ across many characteristics, making
multivariate comparisons difficult.  
For the most part, small businesses fall in the middle.  They may lack the economies of
scale of large firms, making detailed feedback too dear and, for relatively infrequent events, too
slow to amass.  Smaller firms may also lack the skill in analyzing complex data that large firms
can keep on tap.  On the other hand, a small business may be able to assemble information more
quickly than can a large, diffuse firm.  A narrowly focused small business may also gather enough
information to gain feedback about even infrequent events for its oft-repeated transactions.  And a
small firm composed of analytic adepts may match, if not better, its larger competitors in
analyzing data, in large part because the small firm places fewer layers between the data and its
analysts.  One cannot generalize readily as a result.  Still, though a small firm may get accurate
and rapid feedback better than a large one, that may well not be true for relatively uncommon
events – the sort that can make a great difference in running a business.  Here, at least, small
businesses probably resemble large ones more closely than they do consumers, though with wide
variation in similarity.
The second issue, whether the feedback will prove helpful or harmful, shows similar
scatter.  Possibly, as I have suggested, consumers are likely to display various biases more than
businesses, especially large ones.  If so, these biases may cause consumers to use feedback to
strengthen these biases or develop others.  Much depends on the particular bias and the particular
feedback, though, making abstract discussion largely unhelpful.  Much may also depend upon the
form of the feedback, as, for instance, negative feedback and positive feedback for the same task
may have greatly different effects on learning.217  
Looking at one important bias, overconfidence, may render this more concrete.  Related to
this is the illusion of control.  To the extent market participants incorrectly believe they control
their own fates, they will interpret favorable actions as due to their own skills and increase their
overconfidence.  If our populations differ in their senses of control, then, we would expect
positive feedback to increase, not decrease, overconfidence.  In general, businesspeople,
entrepreneurs in particular, do show an unwarranted sense of control over their surroundings.218 
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To the extent this is true, favorable feedback might lead to still more inflated overconfidence.219 
In contrast, consumers, though as a group hardly free from overconfidence, may not have the same
sense of control over their surroundings.  One might cautiously suggest, then, that entrepreneurs
might need some degree of sheltering from the baneful effects of overly favorable feedback, at
least to a greater degree than either consumers, on the one hand, or managers of large firms, on the
other.220
We are left, then, with no simple answer for feedback.  The most straightforward feedback
effects generally favor large firms over small.  So too may some of the less straightforward
effects, such as the negative mix of self-attribution and positive feedback.  To be more helpful one
would have to look closely at a particular situation and examine the types of feedback likely to be
used, who would act upon the feedback, and the quantity, quality, and timing of the information. 
At present, one can safely say only that we cannot lump large and small businesses together with
comfort, and that small businesses stand closer to consumers, and thus closer to a need for
consumer protections, than do large businesses.  How much closer, and how much protection,
must be left to more detailed analyses.
ii. Debiasing
Leaving aside feedback effects, students of cognitive biases have developed a number of
special ways to reduce biased behavior.  Compelling people to set forth counterfactual scenarios,
for instance, can lower their degree of confirmation bias.221  In much the same manner, people
who must consider the effects of an opposite decision often bring their ultimate decision closer to
a rational ideal.222    Overconfidence may be combated by reframing decisions, which avoids
narrowing one’s search through adherence to one’s preconceived notions.223  One may also learn
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to avoid predecisional distortion of information gathering by setting values on attributes before
choice begins.224  Some such strategies have been developed to improve success in making
decisions.225  To the extent these debiasing techniques are commonly used, they may mitigate, or
at least limit appropriately, the use of heuristics and biases.
  They are not in any sense infallible, of course.  Some methods may even increase error.226 
Eliciting alternative outcomes, for instance, may increase the hindsight bias if one tries to elicit
too many alternatives.  We find it difficult to set forth too many alternatives, and thus often
conclude that there were very few ways the event could have turned out.227  Nor should we be
entirely sanguine about the prospects for debiasing.  Many of these biases are likely deep-rooted;
even leaving aside evolutionary psychology, it has been suggested that cognitive biases stem from,
or at least are inextricably intertwined with, the values of the biased person.228
More important from our vantage, not every person is equally likely to perform these
debiasing maneuvers.  Some may well come naturally, but the persistence of error in a range of
settings suggests that they may not be entirely common.  If one learns these techniques, though,
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where does one learn them?   As we have seen, business schools and business texts have taken
cognition to heart.229  These books and courses stress both diagnosis and cure; not just whether a
person or a firm may prove susceptible to biased or inadequate decisions, but how to counter this
susceptibility.  Furthermore, debiasing is most likely to appeal to those who sense their potential
bias.  The excessively self-assured would be more likely to spurn such debiasing techniques as
counterfactual thinking as contrary to their obviously successful way of operating.  Thus, for
example, we see that entrepreneurs tend not to engage in counterfactual thinking.230  Again, we are
likely to see our sliding scale, with large firms most likely to use debiasing techniques, small
firms less, and consumers least of all.
iii. Incentives
Incentives may also affect learning.  Initially one might think that the greater the incentive,
the greater the learning.  One presumably takes greater pains when a lot rests on one’s decision
than when a little rests on it.  The results are not nearly so clear.  Two recent reviews of the
literature conclude that usually incentives bring experimental results closer to the optimum.231 
This result seems clearest when the tasks involved are relatively simple, especially in judgment
and decision making.232  Incentives can sometime worsen performance in more complex tasks,
though, as additional thought pulls one away from more or less efficient instinct or habit.233 
Furthermore, some heuristics may arise precisely because a lot rests on decisions.  Regret
aversion, for instance, depends critically on the magnitude of the potential regret.234  One might
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expect to see incentives increase the degree of regret aversion – in essence, a learned bias, and one
that is learned fastest when the stakes are highest.  Finally, we should again remember the many in
vivo studies of heuristics and biases.  If stock traders, foreign exchange managers, and corporate
buyers display a range of cognitive errors when using real money, their own and their employers’,
then we should take these biases seriously even if they can be mitigated by incentives in the
laboratory.  After all, business history teems with tales of organizations oblivious to the lessons of
experience – or, perhaps worse, of organizations that learned the wrong lessons.235
It is thus difficult to say what effect the presence of incentives might have on consumers,
small businesses, or large businesses without careful attention to the type of decision potentially
affected by the incentives.  Nor is it always clear in which of these groups incentives might be
greatest.  Large firms have the potential to enter into larger transactions than typical individuals or
small firms.  Their transactions are not necessarily larger, though.  More important, their
transactions as a percentage of size may usually be smaller.  Small firms are less likely to diversify
than large ones, making each decision potentially more important.  Moreover, in large firms the
gap between good performance and reward probably will be greater than for small firms or
consumers.  If a purchasing manager saves Wal-Mart a million dollars a year she is unlikely to get
much of a reward, beyond perhaps a modest bonus and an infinitesimal rise in the value of her
Wal-Mart stock. Nor is even that reward likely to be automatic or rapid.  If an owner of a small
firm or a consumer saves a hundred dollars, it goes directly into her pocket – a much more vivid
reward and a much more direct one.236
Adding further to our difficulty is the clarity with which an incentive is set forth. 
Ordinarily laboratory experiments make the incentives quite clear – a prize goes to the best
performer, or one gets paid more for completing a task more quickly, or the like.  Real-life
incentives are not always that clear.  How do you know whether your actions are prudent or
imprudent?  Here incentives merge with feedback.  Even if a lot of money rests on the outcome of
a decision, that outcome may be affected by more than the quality of your decision.  The effect of
the incentive may thus be blunted – and, if one is prone to the attribution bias, blunted greatly – by
these complications.237
Where does this leave us?  Regrettably, somewhat in mid-air.  The main use of the
incentives literature may well be in how it makes us look at laboratory findings.  This is altogether
appropriate, and we should be cautious when we extrapolate too carelessly from in vitro studies to
in vivo policies.  To the extent that incentives mitigate biased behavior – clearly a considerable
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extent for some biases – we should be less inclined to change the law to deal with the biases that
remain.  On the other hand, plenty of field studies show robust heuristics and biases, many of
them very costly indeed, despite all the incentives in the world.  Those who argue that legal
intervention commonly stands in the way of rationality by removing incentives to learn thus might
also wish to temper their fervor.
iv. Expertise
One aspect of learning that may affect small and large businesses differently is expertise. 
One would think that expertise would carry with it great accuracy.  Obviously expertise has some
value, or the market would long since have diminished its worth.  This point has been verified
often.  For example, professional traders are more nearly Bayesian than are MBA students, as
shown in market simulations.238  More knowledgeable managers show fewer framing effects than
less knowledgeable managers.239   One should also recall the Kruger and Dunning study which
showed that the less able tend to be more overconfident than the more able.240  In light of these
studies, one would be tempted to say that expertise and bias avoidance are closely linked, and thus
focus on when small businesses would show more or less expertise than large businesses.241
The issue is important, but not entirely for that reason.  A great many studies have shown,
rather depressingly, that experts are prone to the same biases in their fields of expertise as they are
outside.  Many of the field studies of business practice discussed above look at the actions of
seasoned and presumably expert businesspeople.242  Still other studies have looked closely at
experts in a wide range of fields.243  In sum, experts not uncommonly display overconfidence in
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their judgment.244  They can find it difficult to place themselves in the position of those less
expert, perhaps because they have developed different methods of analyzing problems and can no
longer go back to their earlier, inexpert selves.245  They often neglect the base rate of an event,
possibly reflecting overuse of subjective probabilities.246  Most dismaying, the general conclusion
most of these studies make is that expertise often proves inferior to rather simple actuarial models,
and that experts do not consistently perform better than relative novices with a modest amount of
training.247  These studies suggest that experts rely too heavily on ill-developed heuristics arising
from their experience.248
What, then, to make of these assorted results?  Just as it was tempting to say that expertise
would eliminate heuristics and biases, so too is it tempting to say that the studies are inconclusive
and thus expertise may safely be ignored, at least once one gets beyond the novice stage. 
Certainly the research is more complex than the first statement would have it, but the added
complexity does not prevent us from making some judgments, albeit tentative ones. If expertise
eliminates some biases and exacerbates others, we might look for situations in which the pertinent
biases fall in one bin or another.  We might also look at the extent and nature of the expertise to
be found in consumers, large firms, and small firms.  Not all expert judgment is biased, as the
range of studies suggests, and possibly some of our groups will have less biased expertise than
others.  Finally, we should be careful not to conclude that the presence of a bias is necessarily
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harmful.  Even if expertise can yield overconfidence, for example, overconfidence can be
adaptive, as in the case of entrepreneurs.249 
This is too complex a task to complete in the scope of one article, or probably one
lifetime.250 A few observations may be in order, though.  First, all parties involved in this article –
consumers, small firms, and large firms – will likely show some degree of expertise.  Large firms
may develop expertise and may buy it, but they should at least have access to expertise in virtually
every aspect of their business activities.  Small firms may be less uniformly expert.  They may
have less skilled outside experts in accounting, law, and the like.  They may also be less expert
internally, though this is less certain.  Small firms are small in part because they engage in fewer
transactions than their larger counterparts, and from repetition can come expertise.  Repetition
may have diminishing marginal utility, though, and may even encourage the formation of
shortcuts that will yield biased behavior as the price of efficiency.  Moreover, small firms may be
small, not because they engage in few transactions, but because they engage in few lines of
business.  A highly specialized small firm may be quite expert in what it does.  Likewise, we
should not generalize too far from the lower educational level of small business owners, as
compared with middle managers.251  This is not irrelevant globally, but may mask some important
subcategories.  Task expertise may come from experience, rather than education.  Moreover, as
noted above, some small businesses are very expert indeed, as they are often created by experts
seeking to forge out on their own.  Finally, consumers seldom are trained formally in sound
consumer behavior, the odd home economics course aside.252  Still, consumers learn by doing, and
do some tasks over and over again.  We may not often shop for cars or houses, but we often shop
for clothes.  At least in principle, we can develop expertise in basic consumer tasks.253  So no
group is entirely inexpert, though large firms likely have more consistent expertise than either
small firms or consumers.
Second, the nature of the expertise may make a difference.  It seems possible that the
expertise of small firms and consumers may derive more heavily from experience, and perhaps
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more limited experience, than that of large firms.  This may create problems for the consumer and
small firm.  To the extent that formal training can constrain inefficient behavior, the less well
trained will not act as efficiently as the better trained.  This can be shown, oddly enough, by some
of the studies that call expert judgment most into question.  Though experts may not do much
better in exercising judgment than novices given some basic training and an actuarially-based
algorithm, they usually do not do much worse – and, importantly, they will do better than those
with neither large amounts of experience nor the algorithm.254  
Finally, consider the nature of problems dealt with by contract and commercial law. 
Problems arising from anchoring may be solved in part by expertise, as an experienced person
may use an internal anchor derived from practice rather than a biased anchor suggested by the
other party.  Rules regulating the validity of comparison prices in advertising, to take one
example, may thus be most important for relatively inexperienced consumers than for relatively
experienced merchants, whether small or large.  In contrast, problems arising from overconfidence
might be worsened by certain types of expertise.  A good example might be the disclosure of
potential risks in a transaction.  The inexperienced may take these disclosed risks seriously.  The
experienced may think they know better and brush by them.  We might thus be more concerned
about methods of bringing risks home beyond mere disclosure when dealing with the expert, at
least insofar as other aspects of their behavior will not limit the damage.
c. Group behavior
The final cognitive effect that may distinguish among consumers, small businesses, and
large businesses is how collective action alters behavior.  Much, perhaps most, economic behavior
results from decisions made by more than one person.  These decisions may arise from elaborate
committee analysis, or from a hurried consultation on the factory floor, or from a chat over
breakfast.  Along with the many contexts come many methods of reaching these collective
decisions.  Almost never, though, are they made by a simple vote with no prior discussion. 
Whatever the nature of the deliberation, it is reasonable to conclude that it has some effect on the
decision that results.
As one may imagine, just what this effect might be is complex.  One scarcely needs
research to suspect as much.  Consider these complementary apothegms: “Two heads are better
than one” and “Too many cooks spoil the broth.”  No surprise, then, that much research has
considered exactly when and how group activity may depart from individual activity, either for the
better or for the worse.  As John Payne has observed, “individual decision behavior is not a
sufficient basis for describing how organizations arrive at decisions.”255  Bringing all this literature
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to bear on our problem would tax the capacities of both reader and writer.256  We can, however,
consider some of the more important themes of this field and see how they might help or hinder
the decisions that consumers and businesses make.257  
Before we can do this, we should reflect briefly on how group behavior affects our three
populations – consumers, merchants, and small businesses.  The first is the easiest.  A great deal
of consumer behavior is individual.  Often, though, consumer decisions are at some level
collective, at the level of family or household.  Personal reflection suggests that very few come at
the end of committee meetings with a carefully managed deliberative process.258  This is not to say
that the decisions will be careless.  Normally they will be as deliberate and careful as time and
information costs permit, and especially important decisions will get quite a lot of attention. 
Moreover, they result from fairly stable, and, teen rebellion aside, cohesive groups.  But the goals
may not always be clear, and family members have clear incentives to sway group judgments in
their favor, even if the result does not maximize the family’s welfare.  
Large firms decide more things, and more important things, in groups.  The board of
directors at the top is merely the highest-ranking of the many groups that a firm of any size uses.259 
Certainly individual agents still make decisions, but typically those decisions are constrained in
order to align the interests of the agent and those of the firm.  Low-level employees thus have
limited scope to commit their employer.  As one moves up the organizational chart, discretion
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directors); Joseph Rosenstein, The Board and Strategy: Venture Capital and High Technology, 3
J. BUS. VENTURING 159, 161, 164 (1988) (small businesses tend to have small boards).
266 There are costs as well, of course, just as there are costs to middle management. 
See infra Parts II.C.3.c.ii-iv.
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may increase, but so do work groups and committee meetings.260  At the top, the president may
ultimately make many important decisions, but often on the basis of options developed by
committees below. 
Small businesses do use groups, but not as fully as large businesses.261  Moreover, within
the realm of small business, sole proprietorships and partnerships – the dominant form for the
smaller of small businesses – use groups still less often to make decisions and develop options.262  
This comes as no surprise.  Usually small firms are run directly by their owners, who normally
retain authority.  Unlike purely salaried managers, manager-owners quite directly affect their
financial well-being with each decision.263  Many small firms also have only one person with the
authority to make important decisions – the owner.  Though the owner may consult with
employees before making a decision, it is likely that the owner would do so for confirmation or to
seek information, rather than as part of real deliberation.264  Moreover, when a small firm does use
a group, that group is usually smaller than it would be in a larger firm.265  The small firm thus
lacks some of the advantages of large group deliberation found more routinely in larger firms.266  
i. Heuristics and biases in group behavior
http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/art1
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(results significant, but only at p=0.1).
271 Dagmar Stahlberg et al., We Knew It All Along: Hindsight Bias in Groups, 63
ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 46 (1995).  In particular, groups are superior to
individuals when specifically asked to recall their past decisions and when not constrained by
time.  Id. at 54-55.
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We start by looking at heuristics and biases found among individuals and asking whether
groups are more or less prone to them.  The results are equivocal.  As one thorough review put it,
“close inspection . . . does not suggest a simple or coherent picture of the effects of group
discussion on biases of judgment.”267  Groups usually do attenuate individual biases.  For instance,
a group can effectively average the views of its members.  If a decision has a range of answers,
then, simple averaging should lower variance and increase accuracy, smoothing over random
errors or errors that, though not individually random, are balanced for the group as a whole.268 
Groups thus show less variability than do assortments of individuals.269  Groups may also be less
prone to the availability heuristic, as more information is likely to be vivid to at least one group
member.270   Under some circumstances, they may also show less hindsight bias than
individuals.271  On the other hand, groups appear to make some biases worse.  At least in some
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settings, groups may also be more prone to framing effects.272  Group cohesion may yield
underestimated risk and, relatedly, overoptimism, though not necessarily more than that shown in
individuals.273  And some biases may either be heightened or diminished by groups.  The base-rate
fallacy, for instance, may be higher for groups when the object of the inquiry resembles a member
of a category, but lower when it does not.274  Whether we see the escalation bias in groups
depends in part on whether the group’s members had considered the problem before they met as a
group.  If they did, then one study showed a greater tendency to escalate with existing projects,
thus displaying the sunk cost fallacy.275  Dissonance aversion is another example.  One way to
reduce dissonance is to seek out information that supports one’s decision, even a tentative
decision, over information that conflicts with it.  This confirmation bias exists for individuals, as
already discussed.276  It exists as well for groups.277  Significantly, homogeneous groups show a
more pronounced confirmation bias than individuals, though heterogeneous groups show less.278 
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280 Norbert Kerr and his colleagues have made the most valiant attempt to do so,
using social decision theory to explain when and in what direction group decisions might depart
from the ideal.  Kerr et al., supra note 267. Where their method can be studied cleanly, it has
been confirmed.  See, e.g., Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Jurors vs. Bias in Juries: New Evidence
from the SDS Perspective, 80 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 70 (1999). 
Regrettably, their method depends heavily on precise models of decision-making and accurate
estimates of probabilities, and is therefore all but impossible to use in real-life decisions.
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rules.  See, e.g., David Austin-Smith & Jeffery S. Banks, Information Aggregation, Rationality,
and the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 34, 34 (1996); Saul Levmore, Ruling
Majorities and Reasoning Pluralities, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 87, 88-90 (2002).  
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More generally, it has been suggested that relatively common biases are exaggerated by groups,
but relatively uncommon ones are attentuated by them, perhaps by a combination of averaging and
dissonance aversion.279
All these almosts and sort-ofs do not invite certainty.  Nor have analysts succeeded in
reconciling them, at least not usefully.280 We might thus simply throw up our hands at this welter
of results and conclude that it provides nothing useful for policymakers trying to distinguish
between group and individual behavior, or, even more perilous, between one type of group and
another.  This pessimism may be warranted if we try to draw policy conclusions based on a
possible difference between individuals and groups in a single heuristic.  Nor are these studies
sufficiently coherent to admit sweeping policy changes of any sort.  
Nevertheless, some aspects of this work are sufficiently coherent and robust to allow for
modest conclusions.  In particular, with appropriate qualifications, one may say that most studies
for most biases show that group behavior attenuates biases, rather than exacerbates them.  The
counterexamples, framing and overoptimism, are fairly common and might be attributed to special
group phenomena such as group polarization or groupthink.281  More often, groups override
minority error, if only by simple majority vote,282 and other times may overpower it through an
averaging function.  For many biases, then, we would see some benefits to collective decision
making
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But, as we have seen, small businesses use groups much less than do large businesses. 
Nor are their groups as likely to avoid error.  One way to avoid propagating or enlarging an error
is to be aware that it might exist and make decisions with that prospect in mind. Just as training in
individual problem solving can improve the quality of decisions, it can also improve the quality of
group performance.283 Thus, modern business schools incorporate the study of heuristics and
biases in their curricula.284    These courses also discuss how groups decide, how their decisions
can go wrong, and how these potential errors can be avoided.  Large firms are more likely to have
business-school-trained managers than small firms, which commonly lack the middle managers
who might be more aware of these pitfalls.285 
Small businesses thus are less likely to take advantage of the ameliorative effects of group
decision making than are large ones, thus making them more susceptible to losses because of the
more baneful effects of heuristics and biases.  But there are group pathologies that can impede
these gains and even create losses.  Groupthink, group polarization, imperfect information
sharing, and imperfect information search all are either peculiar to groups or are enhanced by
groups robustly, and all are potentially significant sources of bias and loss.  If groups cause these,
then perhaps small firms are better off after all.  But, if we look more closely, we may find that
subsets of groups are especially prone to these, and possibly some of those subsets are more likely
to be found among small firms.  In any event, it is to those group pathologies that we must turn.
ii. Groupthink
In studying a number of high-level policy blunders, Irving Janis noted a tendency of group
members to suppress their objections to the emerging collective wisdom.  As a result, Janis
hypothesized, groups would reach a false and premature consensus.  They would fail to consider
alternatives adequately.  They would assess risks and costs in a biased manner.  They would
undervalue the likelihood or potential magnitude of failure.  They would fail to search for useful
information.  They would make inadequate contingency plans because they would not allow
sufficiently for the prospect of failure.  Janis coined the term groupthink for this assortment of
decision-making pathologies.286  He argued that groupthink was most likely to arise in cohesive
groups with similar ideology and background.  Other important symptoms of groupthink were
facing a sense of crisis, insulation from critics, group leadership that tends to direct outcomes,
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external threat, and low self-esteem as a result of recent lack of success.  
This model has a great deal of popular currency.  Indeed, it was recently invoked by the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence as one of the causes of intelligence failure before the Iraq
war.287  Still, much of the evidence for it consists of historical case studies.288  Laboratory studies
of groupthink have proved equivocal.289  In particular, attempts to tease out group cohesion as a
factor have shown little if any groupthink effect.290   It has been suggested that groupthink occurs
only when multiple factors are present, making experiments that isolate these factors irrelevant.291 
On the other hand, the concept may also be overbroad, as some of groupthink’s symptoms may
result from a subset of its causes and others may result from other, distinct subsets.292  When one
looks at the corpus of evidence, experimental and historical, one is left with results that are at best
equivocal.293
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This is true in business contexts as well.  Thus, for instance, the work of Christopher Neck
and his colleagues on self-managing teams supports some key elements of groupthink, such as
group cohesion, responsibility, high stress from external threats, homogeneity,294 and low self-
esteem.295  Looking at the other end of the hierarchy, Randall Peterson and his collaborators
looked at the top management teams of seven Fortune 500 companies at points of success and
failure, examining in part whether groupthink was associated with less successful decision-
making.296  The results supported groupthink, but only in part.  In favor, the study found that
group process and outcome were related, and that groupthink was much more closely associated
with negative outcome than with positive.  On the other hand, some important attributes of
groupthink were more associated with positive outcomes than with negative outcomes.  For
example, unsuccessful groups showed less cohesion, less rigidity, and greater optimism than the
groupthink model posits.297  Indeed, of the behavioral models studied, groupthink did not provide
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the closest fit for any of the unsuccessful cases.  The “absolutist cult” model described
unsuccessful groups consistently better.  This model centers on a strong leader, with authority and
power concentrated in one person who personifies the organization’s identity and future.  It thus
overlaps with groupthink by stressing a strong leader and a cohesive group, but differs from it by
showing greater flexibility, greater sense of control, and greater risk taking.298  Furthermore,
successful groups showed stronger leaders, more centralized authority, greater rigidity, greater
risk-taking, greater optimism, and less legalism than groupthink hypothesizes.  Groupthink’s ideal
method of decision making was the best fit for only one of the seven successful firms.
In light of these ambiguous results, we should look somewhat gingerly at groupthink when
considering how collective behavior might affect the quality of decision making by consumers,
large firms, and small firms.  Recall that groupthink requires group cohesion, homogeneity,
insulation, strong leadership, external threat, crisis, and low self-esteem.  Insofar as consumers act
collectively, they fit this model quite imperfectly.  We might expect to see cohesion and
insulation, and possibly strong leadership, but seldom external threat, crisis, or low self-esteem. 
Homogeneity might exist when the group is spouses or partners, but perhaps not when the family
is broadened to include children.  Large firms fit the groupthink model variably.  We might expect
to see considerable cohesion and homogeneity, at least within any management level.  Groupthink
at the highest level seems not unlikely, given the tendency of boards of directors to follow the
CEO who usually chose them.  Hence Professor Bainbridge’s comment that “[b]oardroom culture
emphasizes groupthink.”299  Strong leadership will vary with the leader and the group.300  A
middle-management group may not have a clear leader.  On the other hand, a group may have a
senior member and more junior members, for which groupthink would seem to be a greater threat. 
Insulation is likewise equivocal.  Very often large firms form compartments – divisions, working
teams, subsidiaries – that may be insulated from the rest of the firm.  Still, large firms are
relatively likely to have internal policing mechanisms, such as audits, quality control checks, and
legal analysis, that subject proposed decisions to scrutiny.  For routine decisions one would not
anticipate external threat or crisis, but businesses are not immune from these.  Nor is low self-
esteem entirely uncommon, at least among middle-managers.  More hubristic CEOs might not
display this often, but their hubris is part of the problem in the groupthink model.
Small businesses, speaking broadly, may satisfy the groupthink antecedents more often
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and more closely than do large businesses.  Critically, they lack a developed middle management. 
Important decisions are likely to involve the owner or owners.  If the decisions are made
collectively by the owners, then they may well show no leader, unless the firm has a principal
owner or an owner who leads as well as owns.  More typically, though, small firms have one
owner or main owner and a collection of lower-ranking employees.  The owner may consult the
employees when making decisions, but the consultation is not likely to be in the spirit of free and
open debate.  Small firms are also likely to show considerable cohesion, especially in the early
stages.  They probably will lack developed internal checks of the sort large firms require, and they
are not likely to consult others – accountants, lawyers, consultants – much as they make decisions. 
Their boards tend to have fewer outsiders, who might be able to break down homogeneity and
prevent excessive cohesion.301  Finally, threat and the like are probably more the lot of small firms
than larger ones.  Small firms fail much more often than large ones,302 and in their early stages
face any number of dangers ranging from undercapitalization to unexpectedly high competition.  
The groupthink model is far from robust, and it seems not to have been tested using small
firms.  Furthermore, as some studies have shown, the elements of groupthink may well be virtues
if not taken to excess.  Group cohesion avoids squabbling and promotes common effort, which
should yield superior results – and, as we have seen, often does.    Still, insofar as it has value,
there is some reason to believe that it is more likely to appear in small business decision making
than in large business decision making.  An equivocal result, to be sure, but necessarily equivocal
in light of the evidence.303
http://law.bepress.com/osulwps/art1
304 For a review of the early literature, see Kenneth L. Dion et al., Why Do Groups
Make Riskier Decisions than Individuals?, 5 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 305
(1970).
305 There is a distinction to be made between group polarization and choice shift.  In
the former, individuals shift their positions to greater extremes as a result of group discussion.  In
the latter, the group takes a position that is more extreme than the mean of the individual views
before the group met.  The two terms are often used interchangeably, and generally they will be
here.  There are differences, though, because group polarization is individual and choice shift is
collective.  Thus, for instance, one might see choice shift with no group polarization if members
of a group agree on something that departs from their unchanged pre-group preferences.  For our
purposes, though, the difference usually is not material.  On the distinction, see, e.g., Noah
Friedkin, Choice Shift and Group Polarization, 64 AM. SOC. REV. 856, 857 (1999); Verlin B.
Hinsz & James H. Davis, Persuasive Arguments Theory, Group Polarization, and Choice Shifts,
10 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 260, 260-62 (1984); Ohtsubo et al., supra note 268, at
250.
306 See, e.g., Kenneth L. Bettenhausen, Five Years of Group Research: What We
Have Learned and What Needs to Be Addressed, 17 J. MGMT. 345, 356-59 (1991) (reviewing
studies); David G. Myers & Helmut Lamm, The Group Polarization Phenomenon, 83 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 602 (1976) (same).
307 The meta-analysis is Daniel J. Isenberg, Group Polarization: A Critical Review
and Meta-Analysis, 50 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1141 (1986).  Besides the studies cited
to elsewhere, studies of jury behavior have proven fertile.  See, e.g., David Schkade et al.,
Deliberating about Dollars, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1139 (2000).
-68-
iii. Group polarization
One might think that group discussion would yield compromise, with extremists at one
end or the other giving way in part in order to reach common ground with more moderate
colleagues.  Social psychologists have long observed, though, that group discussion can have a
polarizing effect.304  More precisely, where members of a group show some disposition to a
certain behavior, group discussion tends to move the group from the mean of the individual
dispositions of the group members to an extreme.305  Originally psychologists found that groups
produced riskier decisions than the individuals composing them.  Later studies have shown group
polarization for a wide range of attitudes, not just attitudes toward risk, including views on under-
age drinking, pacifism, and the guilt or innocence of a defendant.306  The effect persists across
studies, as shown by an early meta-analysis and by subsequent work.307
In economic realms the results have been similar.  Consider one study in which tax
professionals – tax partners and managers at major accounting firms – were given ambiguous
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scenarios in which the professionals would be asked whether they would support a client’s
position.  In some scenarios, the position, though not free from challenge, was highly defensible;
in others, the position, though not entirely dismissible, was unlikely to prevail.  The professionals
were asked their views before and after group discussion. For all three scenarios with a high
probability of supporting the client’s position, groups shifted toward the taxpayer.  For two of the
three scenarios with a low probability of supporting the client’s position, groups shifted toward
the IRS.308 Similarly, auditors showed polarization when preparing time budgets for audits; where
individual auditors had set short budgets, group discussion shortened them still further, while
auditors with longer budgets, when assembled, lengthened them.309 
That group polarization often occurs is fairly well established.  Why it occurs is quite as
important, for not all groups are equally likely to polarize, or likely to do so to the same degree.  A
close look at causes may allow us to distinguish among the groups likely to be formed by different
classes of economic actors.  Though posited causes for group polarization burgeon, two or three
seem dominant.  One, competitive social comparison theory, rests on the belief that groups have
internal norms that affect the decisions they make.  Members of the group do not wish to lag in
their adherence to the norm, and thus will try to show that they adhere to that norm at least as
much as average.  These norms cannot be measured exactly, though, so the members will compete
in the perceived direction of the group.  Thus, for instance, if the group values risk, then group
members, after getting a sense that this is true, will compete to increase their stated risk
preferences.310  The principal alternative is persuasive arguments theory.  This derives from the
force and quantity of arguments that are made in the course of discussion.  A group that leans in
one direction will produce more arguments in that direction.  These in turn will strengthen the
adherence of each predisposed person, and may also sway those more lightly committed in the
other direction – who will, after all, gain little support from discussion.311  Meta-analysis suggests
that both play a role, with that of persuasive arguments somewhat the greater.312  Other studies are
consistent with varying aspects of these models.  For instance, arguments that favor increased risk
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have been found more influential, and those who favor risk tend to take the lead in making
decisions.313  These findings both support and extend the persuasive arguments model, in that
arguments given greater weight by group members will have the same biasing effect as arguments
heard more often.  Likewise, studies have shown that unanimous groups show greater polarization
than non-unanimous groups.314  This is consistent with either leading model; as unanimous groups
might more clearly set a norm than majority groups and unanimous groups might produce more,
and more persuasive, arguments than majority groups.
Group polarization potentially exacerbates existing individual errors in risk assessment
and in judgment.  By turning a gentle lean into a crazy tilt, a group may produce a harmful
judgment that no individual in it would initially have espoused.  It may also increase the size of
individual biases, particularly those that relate to risk.315  Group polarization may thus, for
example, magnify escalation bias, over-optimism, and overconfidence.316  On the other hand, not
all shifts from a statistical mean are baneful.  Timid individual judgments may point in the correct
direction, but insufficiently so, making a less repressed collective judgment superior.317  As Cass
Sunstein has pointed out, people tend to avoid extremes when acting alone, but may, when
supported by others, allow their real judgments to emerge.318  We thus must consider, not just
whether this economic actor or that is likely to see group polarization, but whether its groups are
likely to polarize helpfully or harmfully.
As with groupthink, some of the conditions giving rise to group polarization are more
likely to be found in small business groups than in large business groups, just as they are in
consumers.  In particular, small business groups are more often homogeneous, which increases the
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magnitude of group polarization.  Moreover, small business groups are likely to be presided over
by the entrepreneur.  Social influence figures greatly in business group discussions, so one would
expect the entrepreneur’s views to get especial weight.319  Entrepreneurs tend to be overconfident,
over-optimistic risk-takers, prone to escalation and heedless to peril.320  With a risk-taker as
leader, one would expect a risky norm, on the one hand, and risky arguments, on the other, that
should yield group polarization.  Moreover, to the extent the entrepreneur is excessively risk-
seeking, group polarization may create even a less economically desirable level of risk. 
Consumers, almost by definition, are not unusually risk-prone, even if the family is in many
respects homogenous.321  To be sure, risk-seeking is not inherently pathological.  Indeed, in a
sampling of large firms, risk-seeking by the CEO was at least weakly correlated with business
performance.322  Possibly this correlation continues for the still more buccaneering entrepreneur. 
As noted earlier, perhaps entrepreneurs need their exuberance to overcome the real perils of
entrepreneurship.  But with this potential virtue is a potential harm when the entrepreneur works
collectively, a harm more likely to emerge as the small business grows and matures.  
Whatever the overall merits of Candide as entrepreneur, though, it seems that Candide as
the chair of a meeting is likely to produce a particularly biased result – and the small firm is more
likely to have a Candide as chair than the more Eeyoreish middle manager, to shift genres rather
abruptly.  The consumer is more likely to fall in the middle, given the huge range of consumer
behavior.  Where small businesses make group decisions, then, they are relatively likely to fall
prey to group polarization, and that polarization is less likely to be helpful than harmful.  Again,
though as always a bit tentatively, cognition suggests some increased susceptibility on the part of
small business. 
iv. Shared and unshared information
Finally, one of the virtues of groups is their ability to pool information.  In principle, the
members of a group can assemble all their information and consider it fully before reaching a
decision.  The resulting decision would thus be better informed and less prone to error than would
the individual decisions of group members.  To some degree, this happens.  Members of groups
do pool information, and that information is considered to some extent.  Given the value of time,
incomplete pooling is no surprise.  Still, the information that is pooled does not properly represent
the available information, which can yield skewed decisions.
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Research here starts with the much-replicated finding that groups give greater weight to
information held in common by the group’s members than by information held uniquely by a
member of the group.323  The group spends more time discussing the common information and,
perhaps surprisingly, ends up giving greater weight to the common information as a result of
discussion than would the individuals left to themselves.  Unshared arguments often go
unexpressed, and shared arguments are better remembered by the participants.324  Shared
information also is brought up much earlier than unshared information, thereby influencing initial
views more strongly.325  The result is more extreme opinions.326  Beyond that, the self-limited pool
of information and the reiterated discussion of what is shared lead groups to overconfidence
through inflated consensus.327  Relatedly, biased information pooling exacerbates the small
numbers bias – the tendency to attach excessive weight to unrepresentative information, ignoring
information that puts the small sample in context.  This is particularly troubling for decisions
involving risk.  Unlikely events, by definition, seldom occur, so limited experience tends to
underweight them; as a result, the small numbers bias leads to underestimated risk.328
To some degree these effects can be overcome.  Training in methods of information
sharing increases both the amount of information shared and the speed with which it enters
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discussions, though shared information still dominates.329  So, for example, a group organized
with a critical thinking norm will use more unique information than one based on consensus.330 
Furthermore, the more diverse the group’s views, the greater the degree of information pooling.331 
Relatedly, a group that has worked together or has members with a great deal of task experience
will tend to share information less, perhaps because they overvalue their common experience.332 
Status also counts.  Higher-ranking members of groups are more likely to bring up unique facts,
particularly late in discussion, than are lower-ranking members.333  Finally, so does expertise;
when group members are experts or at least are introduced as experts, they are more likely to
repeat unique information, and the information they repeat is more likely to be remembered by
members of the group.334
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Which groups, then, are most likely to conduct biased information search, with all that
entails?  Groups that are too homogenous or heterogenous; groups without training in information
sharing; groups without experts; groups without high-ranking members; and groups that have
worked together frequently.  Consumer groups meet almost all of these categories, save perhaps
lacking high-ranking members (and often a family group has a clear leader, at least for certain
classes of decisions).  Small and large businesses do not fall cleanly on either side of a cognitive
divide.  Possibly small business groups, where they exist, will be more homogenous, but they will
also be more likely to have a clear leader.  Larger firms, for the reasons discussed earlier, are
somewhat more likely to have trained members.335  It is not at all clear whether large or small
businesses are more likely to use groups that have worked together or that have a great deal of
task experience.  One may speculate that small businesses are somewhat more likely to do so, if
only because fewer managerial employees means fewer potential committee members.  On the
other hand, fewer potential committee members may mean that the members are less likely to
have expertise in the task before them.  
Biased information search thus does not provide a reason to distinguish large firms from
small, at least not from the rather general perspective of contract law.  The effect is too broadly
present, and distinctions between large and small firms are likely to evade generalization and thus
regulation.  Rather, problems with information search are more likely important as added reasons
to police in general, with other heuristics and biases providing the basis to distinguish between
large and small firms.336  An example might be the law of small numbers, to which entrepreneurs
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are especially prone.337  This is exacerbated by biased information search.  To the extent one not
prone to this bias could take advantage of it systematically, there might thus be a role for contract
law to correct for this error.
Summing all this up is both necessary and impossible.  Necessary, because there are so
many potential differences among large firms, small firms, and consumers; impossible, because
these differences do not all point in the same directions.  Put most broadly, which may do for the
purposes of this survey, large businesses and consumers differ on a great many attributes relevant
to contracting.  Large firms are wealthier, which allows them to spread risk and contract more
cheaply for insurance.  Their size also allows them to weather moderate adversity more easily,
which can, among other things, give them a powerful tool in disputes.338  Large firms gather more
information and can process it more cheaply, allowing them to rely less on approximate and
inaccurate rules of thumb and more on methodical, fact-driven analysis.  Finally, large firms have
many cognitive advantages over consumers, though not all the heuristics and biases cut
unequivocally in their favor.  Those based on group decision making are especially equivocal. 
Still, on balance cognitive concerns potentially justify the special treatment vouchsafed consumers
in the law.
Small business complicates matters.  At the most general level, most of these heuristics
and biases are present for small businesses, more so than for large businesses but less so than for
consumers.  That level may, however, be too general for policy making.  Closer in one finds fewer
generalizations that are both sweeping and valid.  Thus, for instance, we have seen that small
businesses owners may generally be less well educated than corporate middle managers, but there
are plenty of small firms run by the cognitive elite.  Small firms may have problems amortizing
the cost of information over enough transactions to make its acquisition profitable, but they may
develop concentrated expertise that exceeds that of generalist larger firms.  Perhaps most
important, small firm owners come in very different types, and the different types are prone to
different heuristics and biases in greatly varying degrees.  
This is messy, and suggests that a one-size-fits-all approach to treating small business in
contract and commercial law will fail.  We can make some cautious suggestions here, though, on
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the use of the heuristics and biases literature in this realm.  First, there are effects that sharply
distinguish small businesses from large.  Overoptimism, escalation, expertise, incentives, and
others show some real disadvantages for small firms.  Second, even when small business’s
heterogeneity blurs clear distinctions, we may see different cognitive failings pointing to similar
results.  A high-tech start-up may be more prone to overconfidence than a Ma and Pa party store. 
The Ma and Pa store may, however, be more prone to availability.  These biases can both yield a
tendency to overreact to vivid but misleading information – the former because the information
may induce too confident a decision, given the existing propensity toward overconfidence, the
latter because the vivid information will induce too strong a reaction from someone not ordinarily
inclined toward extreme judgments.  A common cure, such as restricting the supply of certain
types of dangerous information or requiring that it be presented in less inflammatory settings,
would address both difficulties.339  Third, and last, where the effects are not clear-cut the answer
may not be abandoning the job as futile, but rather crafting careful boundaries and cautious
outcomes.  Contract covers a wild array of relations, and its principles must as a result be rather
general.  But many areas within contract have their own special rules, and in those a close look at
particular relations among consumers, small businesses, and large businesses may prove fruitful,
and indeed already have.  Even within contract some doctrines have become sensitive to context,
and in these one might cautiously expand the pertinent contexts with profit.
III. HOW SHOULD SMALL BUSINESSES BE TREATED?
In one article, however long, it would be impossible to catalog every consumer or
merchant rule and discuss how small businesses might best fit under it.  Instead, we shall consider
more generally how the law might deal with small businesses.  Should all contracting parties,
consumer, small business, and large business alike, be treated like consumers?  Should all small
businesses be treated like consumers?  Should small businesses be treated specially, with some
sort of intermediate rule?  Should contract and commercial law move toward standards, the better
to make finer distinctions among types of market participants?  These shall be addressed in turn.
A. Treat all businesses like consumers
The simplest solution is to apply consumer rules to everyone.  To the extent that even large
firms must pay for information and then do not process it ideally, the consumer rules that lower
costs and increase clarity may be useful.  So too would rules that reduce cognitive error.  Still,
using consumer rules generally would be overkill.  Consumer rules often are not appropriate for
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ordinary business transactions.  To take an extreme example, for most commercial transactions
cooling-off periods would impair contractual stability with no substantial gain.  Even relatively
innocent provisions like plain language laws have their pitfalls.  Purely commercial contracts may
be difficult to read, but if they are read only by experts then we may not care much about tortured
but precise legal syntax.  Moreover, the costs of redrafting commercial lending agreements,
purchase agreements, and the like may exceed whatever benefit comes of having them laid out in
simple language.  Drafting is costly – not just because the drafters will demand compensation, but
because even good drafters may introduce ambiguities or errors that will be disputed and perhaps
litigated.340  
In addition, some consumer rules do justice at the expense of certainty.  Statutes allowing
only reasonable periods for repair or a reasonable number of attempts before refund leave open
the meaning of reasonable.341   Very often certainty is the only thing commerce asks of law.  The
parties will write their own contract and handle their own informal justice, using the contract as
backdrop.342  Contract law is the fallback in case of dispute, rather than the flexible guide to
performance.343  Given that, most businesses would prefer certain law with predictable, low-cost
answers to a more flexible, less certain rule that would provoke litigation.344  
More fundamentally, we should use some caution in using behavioral data to make such
sweeping changes in the law.  Cognitive psychology and experimental economics do not want for
equivocal studies and shifting paradigms, or for users who are unwary of methodological limits.345 
Not all of the heuristics and biases have been demonstrated in commercially realistic scenarios, a
concern when factors tending to mitigate these biases would likely be present in real life.  The
effects shown by even the best of these studies are not always large.  When they are, one must still
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consider the costs of parentalist regulation. A degree of conservatism may thus be appropriate –
not that we should fail to look at law from this vantage, but we should do so with some care not to
overreach.346
Finally, there are political reasons not to do so.  One is the unlikelihood that any such
attempt would clear a legislature or a supreme court.  Consider the troubled revision of Article
Two of the U.C.C., in which relatively modest substantive changes provoked massive industry
criticism and ultimately the scrapping of the draft and the departure of the Reporter and the
Associate Reporter.347   Another is the likely effect if a one-size-fits-all rule were proposed.  After
all, we have had those rules for most of the history of law, and they were seldom favorable to
consumers.  There would be considerable pressure, one may predict, to curtail consumer
protection, thus making matters worse rather than better for the most severely affected parties. 
The remaining uncertainty and the reduced protection would yield a measurably inferior contract
law.
B. Treat all small businesses like consumers
Another possibility is to lump small businesses with consumers.  This preserves the
important distinction between large and small businesses and recognizes that at times small
businesses resemble consumers more than large businesses.  Moreover, linking small businesses
and consumers might make their common rules harder to weaken, as the two groups could more
easily fight large firms politically than could only one.348  Some state UDAP statutes do something
like this, at least through a focus on transaction size.349  Still, not all rules would be appropriate for
joint adoption.  Some consumer rules focus on problems held mainly by consumers; others focus
on problems held also by small businesses.  Indeed, some focus on problems held mainly by
consumers dealing with small businesses, as in some of the used-car rules and small lending rules.
We would also have a problem with definitions.  What is a small business?  The Small
Business Administration takes fifty pages of the Code of Federal Regulations to struggle with this
question.350  Does one use the SBA’s most common approach, based on the number of employees
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in a particular industry?  Or how about its main alternative, annual sales volume?  The SBA’s
attempts to draw lines makes for puzzling reading.  Why, for instance, can a business engaged in
cookie and cracker manufacturing (as defined in North American Industry Classification System
311821) qualify for SBA largess if it has up to 750 employees, but a business that turns out frozen
cakes, pies, and other pastries (NAICS 311813) do so only with 500 or fewer?351   How about 750
employees for soap and other detergent manufacturers (NAICS 325611), but only 500 for polish
and other sanitation good manufacturers (NAICS 325612)?  And then there are the mixed
standards – for instance, 1,500 employees for courier services (NAICS 492110), but annual
revenues of $21,500,000 for local messengers and local delivery (NAICS 492220).  Drawing new
lines to split large businesses from small would yield equally strange results, prepared, one
assumes, at great expense, as each industry’s trade association would sally forth to push for a line
drawn here or there or somewhere else.352
Even good rules of this sort, and we may assume that the SBA’s rules are good, would
yield much litigation.  Who is to determine whether a firm falls into this bin or that, which might
be the critical question in a dispute?  The SBA has administrative officials who do this, and an
administrative appeals process to supervise it, but we would have only the overtaxed and inexpert
courts.353  To be sure, they would have the guidance of the NAICS Manual, filled with nuance and
velleity on the fine distinctions among these many categories – fourteen hundred pages of nuance
and velleity, in fact.354  Not ideal reading for a generalist court.
Perhaps courts would do well with this task, albeit at much cost.  Perhaps instead the rule
could be simple – a single number of employees for all industries, say.  A uniform rule would
trade accuracy for simplicity, though, and the trade may not be a good one.  But even if the
NAICS category is settled or made uniform, there may still be disputes about whether a firm falls
on one side of the line or the other.  How does one count part-time employees?  Employees of
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-80-
wholly-owned subsidiaries?  Partly-owned?  Joint venturers?  Affiliated firms?  This too has
yielded much regulation and litigation.355  Rules that draw these lines, however closely tailored,
might even drive business decisions.  For instance, a firm might outsource work or spin off
subsidiaries rather than cross one of these lines and lose its legal protection – not desirable, if
crossing the line would otherwise be the better choice.356  
Most important, what definition of small business would properly capture the reasons for
classing small businesses with consumers?  The SBA definitions were designed for SBA
purposes.  Deciding whom to reward with low-cost loans or preferential contracts is hardly the
same as deciding whether two private parties have made a contract or breached it.  We would thus
need a new set of definitions, adding to the complications of small business management.
And, given the aims of contract and commercial law and the exploitable weaknesses of
small business, what criteria would let us draw the most useful lines?  Number of employees? 
This may correlate with sophistication, but surely hiring large numbers of undereducated and
inexperienced employees adds little in that vein.  On the other hand, a very modest number of
even sophisticated employees may not have the time or resources to gather information.  For some
purposes, the presence of middle management might be more relevant.  With middle management
some of the cognitive problems that attend entrepreneurship would be mitigated, as might some of
the problems that can result from groupthink or other unfortunate aspects of group
decisionmaking.  Others, though, might be exacerbated, such as biased information search.
Sales volume?  This may do better, particularly for the aspects of consumer law that rest
on assets and access to credit.  Even there, though, profit margins vary greatly, so two firms with
identical sales volumes may have very different incomes, very different prospects, and very
different access to capital.  In addition, sales per dollar of assets also varies wildly.  As a result, a
firm could have modest assets but a high sales volume, rendering the firm relatively susceptible to
financial shock.  Sales volume may not, however, be a good proxy for information.  Within a
product area, sales and information may correlate well.  But a million dollars in sales may mean
three houses or two million cans of corn.  Even the diminishing marginal return from the later
corn sales does not efface the great difference in the quantity of information in the latter case. 
Moreover, a small, low-grossing firm may be very knowledgeable.  Indeed, many small firms
begin precisely because the founders know a lot about a field.357  A large-grossing firm may know
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less, if its interests are widely dispersed.  Sales volume also gets at cognitive issues very
indirectly.  Perhaps sheer quantity might overcome some cognitive effects, but others might
increase as a sort of defensive mechanism.  Heuristics arise in part from our attempt to make sense
of a welter of information effectively and efficiently.358
Assets?  Possible again, but, like sales volume, an imperfect proxy for resources.  Assets
often cannot be borrowed on, should the market in those assets be modest.359  Just as sales volume
may come from large assets or small, assets may produce much income or little.  Furthermore,
assets are far harder to value than sales, and far more susceptible to manipulation by creative
accountants.  When one looks beyond resources to information and cognition, assets do even less
well than sales.  At least sales volume correlates with number or size of transactions within an
industry.  Assets may or may not be used, and their use may generate much information or little. 
Nor is relative wealth a guarantee of cognitive capacity.  Indeed, some heuristics and biases arise
from ownership.  The endowment effect, for example, comes about because owners value what
they own more than what they do not.360  Cognitive dissonance operates in somewhat the same
way.  Dissonance aversion requires something aversive.  We thus might see more profound
dissonance aversion over relatively large decisions than over relatively small ones, though both
may show aversion.361
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None of these methods of separating small businesses from large is perfect.  Each captures
some aspect of the reasons for making the distinction, but none captures all, and some reasons are
left largely unaddressed by any of these methods.  Ideally one would draw the lines to capture
every potential gain from line-drawing, thus maximizing the benefit from this exercise.362  A
system that is neither overinclusive nor underinclusive would be horribly complex, even by the
standards of administrative law.  The SBA itself has a good many exceptions to its basic schema,
in a system far more controlled than the universe of consumer law.363  The alternative, a simple
test, would often err.  Either would yield many unintended results, as businesses might arrange
their behavior to fit under the desired heading.  Drawing these lines might well yield great
benefits, but they would have to to justify their costs.
C. Craft an intermediate rule for small business
The solutions above in part provoke doubt because they merge classes of businesses or
people that aren’t entirely alike.  Treating all contracting parties the same means that we must
treat General Motors like Forrest Gump, or perhaps Forrest Gump like General Motors.  Treating
small businesses like consumers means that we lump together those on opposite sides of contracts
and contract disputes.  One way out is to craft special rules for small businesses, creating a third
category of legal rules.  More precisely, there would be three classes of contracting parties that
would have largely similar but distinct bodies of contract law applied to their transactions.  After
all, consumer contracts are generally treated like commercial contracts for most of contract law –
consideration, remedies, conditions – but with some critical variations at important points.  A
small business contract law would do much the same.
The idea is hardly original.  Most recently, Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott have
embarked on a project to define classes of contracting parties and describe the legal regime that
should apply to each.364  Before that, though, the Legal Realists at times contended that there is no
Contract Law, but rather laws governing different sorts of legal relations – construction contracts,
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personal services contracts, real property conveyances, and so forth.365  Indeed, still earlier the law
of contract arose from these assorted laws of voluntary legal relations.366  It seems clear enough
when we describe the American legal system that we do have many different laws under the
heading of contract, each with its own vocabulary, its own norms, its own rules, often flatly
contradicting analogous aspects in other areas.  Why not a separate set of rules for small business? 
If indeed small businesses are in some degree distinct from their larger counterparts, on the one
hand, and from consumers, on the other, then they may warrant distinct treatment, just like sellers
of goods or employees or builders or stockbrokers.
This attractive proposal has at least two related difficulties: definition and content.  To
craft small business law we must be able to define small business.  Otherwise we cannot
determine how small businesses differ from other businesses and thus how the law might
accommodate those differences.  So far, though, defining small business has proved difficult and
has yielded at best modest success, even in the limited realm of access to government programs.367 
Too narrow a definition and one omits firms that merit distinct treatment; too broad a definition
and one loses any distinctiveness and with it any reason for different law.  Possibly different parts
of contract law may need different definitions, depending on which aspect of smallness that part
of law affects.  Should the definitions grow too complex, though, they become expensive, and the
costs of policing their borders grows immensely.  And three categories means two borders.  The
border between consumers and small businesses may be relatively easy to define, though the
plethora of businesses without employees in the United States suggests that may not be the case.368 
As we have seen, though, the border between small and large business may prove difficult to
draw, and ill-defined borders cause uncertainty and increase the costs of business.
Nor will it always be easy to craft a good rule that stands between pure consumer
treatment and pure large merchant treatment.  Intermediate rules are not uncommon in contract
and commercial law.  In remedies, the reliance measure usually stands between expectation and
restitution.  Some scholars suggest that it has an important role in the structure of remedies.369  In
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any case, the intermediate measure is used, particularly in promissory estoppel cases370 and other
cases with relatively weak fault or uncertain formation.371  Divisibility doctrine also has an
intermediate effect, allowing for partial enforcement of an obligation to avoid complete
forfeiture.372 Still, these are exceptions to a generally binary approach.  True, carefully designed
intermediate rules can avoid the contorted doctrine that results when courts seek to apply harsh
binary rules to compelling sets of facts.  Intermediate rules, however, can end up as ill-defined,
almost equitable doctrines that are hardly rules at all, a result with its own great costs. 
D. Use standards-based analysis to choose among rules
Perhaps setting up rules to put businesses into one camp or another seems too complex or
too arbitrary or both.  One might instead move to a standards-driven legal regime.  Not all
businesses are created equal; neither are all consumers.  The courts might thus take the relative
sophistication, size, information costs, cognitive capacity, and the like of the contracting parties
into account when deciding which rule to apply and how to apply it.
If courts apply this method correctly, we might thus avoid the errors of over-inclusiveness
and under-inclusiveness that the other two methods may show.  Indeed, this approach might also
solve the over-inclusiveness that a broad definition of consumer now entails.  Some consumers,
after all, may not need the full range of consumer protections, and ought not be able to use them
as post hoc ways to get out of bad deals.  Nor is this method unfamiliar to courts. 
Unconscionability analysis, for instance, looks broadly at the sophistication of the parties as part
of its procedural aspect.  Indeed, standards-based analysis is ubiquitous in the law – witness the
plethora of multi-factor tests in constitutional law or the frequent uses of reasonableness tests in
contract and commercial law.373
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Here, though, we face the old rules versus standards debate.374  A standard has the
advantage of nuance, properly applied.  It is cheaper to frame than a tightly-drawn rule.375  It also
lacks certainty.376  While the rules of contract law have some play in the joints, they do provide a
great deal of certainty in run-of-the-mill cases.  Whatever one may say about the mailbox rule, for
example, it does tell us exactly when a contract is formed.  Perhaps standards are not a great
problem in the contract defenses, which are seldom invoked, almost never when a nice use of
standards is needed.377  Unconscionability illustrates this.  The courts routinely state that
businesses normally will not be able to invoke the defense successfully, as they will have too
much market power and sophistication to warrant its use.378  On the other hand, the courts have
sometimes allowed small businesses to invoke unconscionability where the owners were
especially ill-educated or ill-informed, where their market power was especially weak, where the
acts of the other party were especially misleading, and the like.379  But letting standards-based
analysis into more routine areas of contract might yield excessive uncertainty and thus lower the
value of contract law.  Consider, for instance, what would happen if the formation rules, which in
Article 2 depend in part on merchant status,380 might or might not apply depending on a multi-
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factor test of the nature of one’s business.381
To be sure, over time the cases would accumulate and provide certainty in the usual
common-law manner.382  As we see from the agonizing revision of Article 2, though, businesses
mistrust common-law development, seeing it as too plastic and manipulable (implicitly, I suppose,
manipulable by others).383  Furthermore, costs of uncertainty can rest most heavily on small
firms.384  They generally cannot afford highly sophisticated legal advice and innovative
arguments.385  Legal complexity favors the informed, so moving to a more standards-based regime
might ironically make matters worse for small firms, the very ones whom standards were
supposed to help.
We should also consider whether behavioral effects would make a standards-based regime
more or less desirable.  As Professor Korobkin has shown, one cannot paint with a broad brush
here; sometimes rules will fit better with the welter of behavioral effects we show, and sometimes
standards will, depending on the exact legal issue and the exact parties affected.386  For instance,
where the endowment effect387 is strong, a standards-based system may prove helpful, as
uncertainty about the resulting entitlement would diminish the sense of endowment.388  In
contrast, the self-serving bias389 points toward rules: their relative clarity lowers the scope for self-
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serving interpretations by those subject to them, yielding lower litigation costs and increased
settlement.390
Of these heuristics and biases, the self-serving bias seems particularly worrisome for small
businesses.  Entrepreneurs are likely to prove especially prone to this effect, given their
overconfidence and risk-seeking tendencies.391  If so, then a standards-based system applied to
entrepreneurs will probably yield too much undesirable behavior.  In contrast, entrepreneurial
risk-taking should lower the possibility that a vague standard will reduce desirable behavior.392 
We might thus be wary of standards applied, say, to small-business safety regulations, but less
wary about standards applied to contract formation.393  
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, small businesses fall awkwardly in the usual consumer-merchant dichotomies of
contract and commercial law.  By treating them uniformly as merchants,394 the law places burdens
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on small businesses not always appropriate for their real nature – their resources, their abilities to
gather and process information, their propensities to err when doing so.  Though rarely would they
be worse off than consumers in any of these, rarely would they be as well off as large firms.  Their
intermediate status causes problems that the law might properly address.
The perils of failing to do so are evident when we look at some recent changes to the
Uniform Commercial Code.  Revised Article Nine, proposed in 1999 and enacted in all states by
2001, did indeed carve out some consumer protections.395  Sometimes, though, the consumer
protections came alongside tougher rules toward non-consumer debtors.  For example, the
revision allows deposit accounts to serve as security under Article Nine, but not for consumer
transactions.396   Elsewhere the statute resolves prior disputes in favor of senior creditors while
simply not addressing consumer transactions. 397  Yet other changes broadened the scope of
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Article Nine security398 or the breadth of security interests399 in contexts mainly relevant to
business debtors,  again advancing the standing of senior lenders over junior lenders (most notably
unsecured creditors, many of them small businesses) and debtors.400  The proposed amendments to
Article Two similarly show some tendency to favor strong sellers over buyers, though often
excepting or even favoring consumer buyers as they do so. Sellers will be able to recover
consequential damages, but not in consumer contracts.401  Sellers will have the right to cure after
revocation, but not for consumer contracts.402   Sellers can get specific performance,403 and parties,
save in consumer contracts, may agree to specific performance, though a court need not give
effect to their agreement.404  Certainly some changes in the Code favor buyers or relatively weak
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sellers over strong sellers.405  Still, on balance the changes favor a model of contract that works
reasonably well for contracts between large firms.  Exceptions often protect consumers.  They do
not protect small firms.
What, then, is to be done?  No single approach will do.  In part this stems from the dual
role of small business, as both promisor and promisee.  Treating small businesses specially means
that their contracts with consumers, with large firms, and with other small firms need to be
examined separately.  When a small business deals with a consumer, it is unlikely that the
consumer can deliberately capitalize on the informational or cognitive failings of the small firm.406 
Consumers will rarely be able to see the effects of the errors, given the amount of noise interfering
with that information.  Most likely the consumer would merely pay a little less or get a little more
than it would from a larger firm.  But if the consumer stands at a financial, informational, or
cognitive disadvantage to the small business, the case for protecting the consumer remains.  It
may be weaker, for the consumer is closer to the small merchant than to the large merchant.  As a
result, we may generally be best off retaining the usual consumer protections, perhaps with some
generosity where a small business would otherwise assume potentially catastrophic risks without
clearly having been compensated to assume them.  Contract law already has such a doctrine – the
disproportionality limit on consequential damages.407
Small businesses dealing with each other pose greater difficulties.  The group is potentially
so heterogenous that one can have great disparities of resources, information, and cognition within
it, very possibly greater than those between some small businesses and some consumers or large
businesses.  Moreover, even when one small business may clearly be distinguished from another
on some criteria, it may not on others, thus yielding a weaker case for special treatment.  A high-
tech firm with one hundred employees is a small business, just as is a janitorial service run by an
eighth-grade dropout.  The latter operates under some significant informational and cognitive
handicaps.  Still, the high-tech firm has its own difficulties – some of the group-induced biases,
overconfidence, and others may be more problematic for it than for the janitorial firm.  And
though the high-tech firm may generally be better informed, it may well not be for janitorial
services.  Whether these cognitive and informational effects cancel out or leave some imbalance
one way or another cannot be answered without specific parties and contracts in hand.  We can
say, though, that the imbalance is likely modest and, given the costs of intervention, probably not
worth correcting for with bold or bright-line tests.
In contrast, large firms are better able to capitalize on their superior size, information, and
cognition when dealing either with small firms or with consumers.  This does not mean that small
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firms should be granted the status of what Arthur Leff called the “presumptive sillies” of the
law.408    Special treatment may even backfire.  If small firms can get out of deals too readily,
others will be less willing to do business with them for fear that they will exercise those rights.
Still, there are some cases where small businesses so clearly resemble consumers that these costs
are overcome, and here law reform may focus.  Disclosure rules seem particularly well suited to
this extension.  If sellers, lenders, and the like already disclose information to consumers clearly,
simply, and vividly, they can do so to small businesses for little greater cost.  More information is
no panacea, but there are some problems it can solve.
The law already takes these disparities into account when regulating small business. 
Securities regulation takes the cost of money and the cost of information into account when it
relaxes registration requirements for small issuers.409  Much of franchise law is an attempt to
mediate the desire of the franchisor to prevent the franchisee from freely riding on the reputation
established by others and the desire of the franchisee to keep the franchisor from taking undue
advantage of the franchisee’s transaction-specific investment.  We thus see a collection of
statutory and common-law doctrines that give franchisees significant rights, rights that exist in
large part because of asymmetries in wealth, information, and cognition.410  Other statutory
changes have been proposed.  Elizabeth Warren has suggested that in bankruptcy secured
creditors be taxed twenty percent of their security, the proceeds to go to the benefit of unsecured
creditors.411  This would compensate for some of our asymmetries, for unsecured creditors tend
disproportionately to be small firms with modest ability to withstand bad debts and greater
willingness, perhaps because of over-optimism and the like, to extend credit.
One can also use this approach beyond the statute book.  Recall the common-law
dichotomies, or hybrid dichotomies, mentioned in the introduction.  Many of the contract defenses
– duress, unconscionability, mistake, impracticability – invoke questions of resources,
information, and cognition, just as consumer law does.412  Very often common-law courts refuse
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to apply these doctrines to businesses, or apply them only in the most extraordinary cases.413  This
Article’s analysis suggests that these courts may be unduly stingy.  At a minimum, some small
firms so closely resemble non-merchants that they should be treated similarly, not just for the
purposes of consumer law but elsewhere.414  Even doctrines like the parol evidence rule are at
times relaxed when there are pronounced disparities between the parties.415  The courts at times
refer to inequality of bargaining power.416  This may be too blunt an instrument.  As we have seen,
the differences among our classes of contracting parties blur and cross, and simple power does not
encompass all the nuances.  Still, this and other doctrines suggest at least marginal willingness of
common-law courts to tread this path.417  These approaches must be cabined for the welfare of
those subject to them.  Too liberal a set of defenses and potential promisors will shy away from
contracting with those who can readily invoke them.  But a measured examination of resources,
information, and cognition in such defenses as duress, mistake, misrepresentation, promissory
fraud, and of course unconscionability would go far to mitigate the legal difficulties of small
businesses.
One can go further, though, and ask whether something between pure enforceability and
pure unenforceability might be in order.  Perhaps where a promisor faces great, but not
overwhelming pressure, a court might remake the deal rather than decide between pure
invalidation and pure affirmance.  Contract defenses are at root about faulty risk bearing. 
Resources, information, and cognition are most germane to us when they affect a contracting
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party’s ability to shift or bear risk by contract.  The binary result of defenses may, however, be too
blunt an instrument to deal with the sorts of imbalances discussed above, making a risk-sharing
approach potentially attractive.  Still, as noted earlier, this move toward standards has costs.  It is
certainly unfamiliar to most commercial judges.  Possibly, as others have suggested, the courts are
unready for this more Solomonic legal method.418  Perhaps what some have termed the new
conceptualism makes such a move highly improbable.419  It may, however, be worth considering
as a means of tailoring law to reality.
How practical is all this?  More so than consumer law reform, at least in most
jurisdictions.  Though we are all consumers, our interest in incremental consumer law reform
rarely stirs us to act.  We tend to ride freely on the efforts of overworked consumer affairs
associations.420  In contrast, small business has relatively well-supported lobbies in state and
federal legislatures.  Its organizations work to extend the rights of small business (though, it must
be said, they work harder to remove regulatory constraints).421  Legislators are alert to their many
constituents who run or work for small businesses – many, indeed, are small businesspeople
themselves.  Even relatively pro-business legislatures may be willing to favor small businesses
over large.  Congress has small business committees in both houses, creating some institutional
momentum for action.  So too do many state legislatures.  At the least, the pertinent interest
groups might nullify each other, making legislation purely on the merits a little more likely. 
Whatever the political truths, though, small business has fallen on the wrong side of these divides
for too long.  It is time we looked beyond them.
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